Welcome to #GeekSpeak. Tonight's discussion is on "Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts" and will be moderated by Clay Hellman. Please note that all logs are copyrighted by the channel owners, and may not be reproduced or redistributed in any form without prior permission of the channel owners. Go ahead, Clay. Hi. Tonight we'll be discussing Dr. Binswanger's book on teleology. I expect that if we more or less follow the book chapter by chapter that the discussion will last for more than one evening. So I want to start with his introduction and work our way through... Dr. B explains that he is making an argument for an exclusively biological theory of teleology. So I'll ask.. What is teleology? Establishing (quantitatively) how various things relate to one's life, or goals? The science that studies goal-directed action? teleology is a form of causation where the goal of the action is considered the cause of the action. Commonly, it's understood as the study of causes. Causes leading to some end, or goal. Frode is right, essentially teleology studies actions towards goals. Subetai: Only goal directed causes. The actions of a rock falling, for example, are not teleological. Jim: right Ends or goals refer to some living entity. Subetai just named the next point.. would teleology include the study of plants as well? Sarah: yes There is a model case of teleological action... Sarah: Yes, but that is one of the issues Binswanger is trying to prove. He initially starts with human purposeful action. So a goal then, is some projected future state of affairs, as projected by a consiousness? Or is it wider? one which provides us with a first-hand knowledge of these sorts of actions, what is it? Brad, you're jumping ahead, we'll get there. Introspection, Clay? Examining how we make choices? Conciousness is not necessary. Are we to distinguish between Fido's goal to fetch the stick, and my plant's "goal" to grow into an adult plant? I guess Clay will get to that. Subetai, right, we're aware that we have "ends-in-view" We are aware that we set purposes for ourselves and can acheive them. Dr. B begins by pointing out something already mentioned.. Which channel? bradA: whether the concept is wider than consciously projected future goals, and can be applied to the non-conscious actions of plants, is one of the main issues of the book. which is that he distinguishes first between Living actions and inanimate processes.. For the sake of clarity, Dr. B applies the term "actions" only to living organisms. What is it fundamentally that distinguishes between the inanimate processes and the living organisms? The ability to take self-sustaining action. I think the question could be worded better. What does it mean to be alive in the first place? Sube, feel free to reword it. (Rewording:) Between dead and living matter? Yes. Are you asking what's the difference between any process in inanimate matter versus any process in living things, or are you asking what specific processes occur only in living things? (It's more the latter, I'd guess.) That's more like it. I'm asking what gives rise to us distinguishes between the living and the non-living. -es +ing To us? Clay, Binswanger names two distinguishing characteristics: living action is self-produced, and living action is conditional. Okay. Then the crucial difference is in self-initiation. Jim, yes. does self-initiation require consciousness? No. Goal-directed action. Sarah, not in this context, it merely requires internal generation of the action. How do you define "internal generation"? Clay: Like RNA, etc.? For instance, how is the process by which a plant's roots suck in moisture and nutrients different from the process in which an engine uses fuel to produce motion? an engine will not cease to exist if it doesn't get fuel. It'll just sit there. A plan will die. It'll become a *dead* plant, and it won't grow again after it's dead. Yeah, but what's the difference in the processes so far as "internally generated" is concerned. I may have mispoken. ? The plant will never be able to "run" again. er.. didn't I just say that? Yeah, never mind. Sarah asked if self-initiation required consciousness.. You're talking consequences down the line. How would you know just looking at the two actions what kind each was? The difference is the fact that an engine does not act to sustain itself, but a plant does. Right, that's what I was trying to say.. :) When I went away for winter break, I neglected to water a couple of my plants enough. I didn't use the microwave either. The microwave still works. The plants aren't coming back. So the thing that makes something "internally generated" is what it does (sustain the plant's life) rather than where it comes from? Not as plants, anyway. In this sense, self-initiation just means that the cause for the action comes from within. The plant, for instance, may be stimulated by the sun, but it uses it's own energy to move itself. Shouldn't there be some other term for it than "internally generated"? That doesn't seem descriptive of it. Self-initiated. That is, its hard-wiring is set to pursue those values which will allow it to exist. a living thing requires a continual satisfaction of needs. It has (more or less rudimentarily, depending on the species) a "self-initiated" means of getting those requirements. (Thanks, Seth for the wording) ..and continue existing. Subetai: Right. Binswanger later discusses the issue that the energy for the action of living organisms comes from the organism itself. Clay :If self initiation in processes differentiaties between a living and the non-living, does it not imply consciousness? No, it doesn't. Raj, how? I do not think that it does. Jim: right. There has to be something in the definition that addresses "generation" of the action, if you choose to call it "self generated". It's not enough to say that it's an action that sustains the organism's life. Raj: No. Plant's for example have no consciousness, yet their actions are initiated by their own energy, not by an outside source. not necessarily. A plant has no consciousness per se, yet it still grows if certain conditions are right. Does a plant absorb water 'mechanically/ automatically'? Raj: water absorption is not the main function of a plant. Photosynthesis is. (assuming I got that right from high school biology) ? I would suggest the most important fact about living organisms is their mind boggling complexity. Not just that they have certain actions, but that those actions arise as a consequence of a highly specific collection of parts. Main function? Raj, if the plant absorbs water, then it does so automatically. Brad: That's not what distinguishes them. sand can absorb water as well. Ah. Sarah, sure. But Raj is talking about the plant taking action to do so. Clay: Okay, so the definition of "self-generated" is that the plant uses its own energy to perform that action. I think an even better way of putting it would be that "an action produced by an entity, using energy from within that entity, the energy being accumulated by the entity for the purpose of performing such actions". Or does that say more than it needs to? Which actually gets back to the point of distinguishing between the living and the inanimate. I was trying to remember what I could about capillary action. That's automatic, isn't it? Raj: If you mean by automatically that the action of plants is non-volitional, then yes, it is an automatic process. But it is still a self-generated action; an action that the plant must perform to remain alive. A plant absorbs water and not acid (an an example only) for living. So when we say there is no consciuosness involved, this process had to come from natural selection/develomet over time. So some self-initiated actions can come from natural selection/development over time. So some self- initiated actions can come from natural progression without consciousness. A palnt can control how much water it takes up, but it is automatic, though not directed by a consciousness. a dead plant won't absorb any water. Subetai, all those things are certainly relevant, I'm not sure if they're all definitional, but we will be coming back to this later. There's a whole chapter on it. Well.. Clay: okay A dead plant won't absorb water for the purpose of living. It is an active process -- biochemical work must be done to create the condition that causes the water to flow against gravity and pressure. We've moved somewhat into the next distinction already, but I'd like to bring it specifically to bear. Brad: In other words, energy is expended. Yes. Raj: Right. Self-initiating doesn't require consciousness. It requires a type of organism that stores energy in itself to be able to cause its own actions. Alot of what I wanted to start covering is background type information, defining our categories before focusing in on the more technical aspects. Jim: hence the _biological_ basis! I get it! :-) Jim : Agree and that is the definition which Subetai gives too Such as "how do plants that act automatically to pursue goals?" How do plants act automatically to pursue goals? Dr. Binswanger next draws a line between Vegetative and Conscious actions, can I have a few examples of conscious actions? Subetai, we will get to that. vegetative: photosynthesis. conscious: hunting/gathering. I was trying to clarify what you said. The grammar was ambiguous. Thanks. Sube, ok. Conscious Action: I determine that I need stamps to mail my bills, and decide to go to the post-office to purchase them. The question we will get to is "How do plants pursue goals when everything they do happens automatically. For humans, vegetative would be autonomic functions, like the heart beating, or digestion. Conscious actions are things that you choose to do. Ah. the word "vegetative" means more or less unconscious, then? Are conscious actions only chosen actions? Clay : Do plants pursue goals in the first place? Goals as defined as what? Plants still face a lif-or-death alternative. life Clay: I'd think yes, conscious actions are those which you had a choice about. I'm not discussing the specific question of plants and goals now, I was using it as an example of where we were going after the background material was covered. would an animal that hunts other animals or grazes be considered to be engaging in vegetative or conscious actions? Goal directed action simply means the action taken by a living entity results in the continued life of the entity. Sube, when a dog sees a bone, then proceeds to go and get it, is it acting consciously? TomM: it results in the possibility of future like actions. Yes, I think :) it does Clay: Depends on what you mean by "consciousness." The dog is certainly conscious there is a bone thee to be had, but it doesn't think it out. Okay. I think you can say that plants have goal-directed actions because "goal" doesn't necessarily imply consciousness or choice. "Goal" does include those things when applied to higher organisms, but there's no reason why plants can't have goals. Clay: Yeah, I think that's a conscious action. what I don't understand is how we can pretend to know whether animals enjoy some degree of conscious thought... Consciousness is synonymous with projective action -- the ability not just to be aware of things, but to project potential future states (oneself foremost in the scenario), followed by commitment, followed by action to achieve the state. In other words, a dog getting a bone is not a vegetative action. Vegetative action is nothing like this. Subetai, good, I wanted to establish that conscious actions extend beyond the realm of the human. Cyrane raises a good point. Dr. Binswanger addresses this point... Cyrane: The same way you can assume that other people are conscious, and not somehow categorically different from you. alright... t He points out that other animals have similar sensory faculties.. and that we can infer that at least some of them work similarly to our own.. We have to assume that anything fundamentally similar between us and what we observe in animals, is a common phenomenon. FOr example.. He points out that dogs, like humans, locomote better in a lighted room. That they might both look up when a sound is made. then I suppose that in psychological terms consciouness is the capacity to be conditioned? I think there are elements to consciousness that can be identified in other living entities. Such as the ability to focus attention. A dog looks at you when you call its name. It can recognize sounds selectively. Conditioned? Cyrane, I'm not sure what you mean exactly. yeah... the pairing of one stimulus with another Cyrane: Conditioned? Absolutely not -- that is behaviorist/Skinnerian error. I don't see how Consciousness is the ability to differentiate perceptual entities, if I'm not mistaken. Dr. Binswanger is making the point that there is a wealth of information from which to infer consciousness in other animals, including other humans. Subetai : If Goal is some future scenario which one wants, it canot be isolated from consciousness. Vegetative actions therefore do not have goals, only definite cosequences. On the other hand, if u define goal as an outcome coming from a action, then vegetative actions can have goals. Cyrane: No, consciousness is the faculty of awareness. My cat notices me enter the room, it is conscious of me. This doesn't mean it is conceptually thinking about me (it isn't), but is is aware of me, in a way that plants in the room are not. Am I on target? No more talking about goals darn it. ok Conscious action is the ability to project goals, evaluate them, commit to them, and initiate the action to achieve them. Man and animals don't differ on this point. Consciousness is awareness of one's surroundings. We can tell that people are conscious (and not asleep or in a coma) by seeing how they react to changes in their environment (which requires awareness of one's surroundings). Like by attracting their attention. then when we say... conscious action... what does that mean exactly Seth: Consciousness is many things. Raj: You raise some good points. Initially, as Dr. Binswanger points out, we form concepts of goals on the basis of PURPOSEFUL concious actions... an action that indicates awareness? Sube: Doesn't that imply being able to differentiate sensory input? Raj: "Goal" is some end which any given action supports. Seth: yeah, it does (rather than twitching, etc., in response to stimuli) Subetai : my question is does one want the outcome or not for it to be defined as a goal? humans speak of plants' actions as goal-oriented, plants don't Raj: What Dr. Binswanger then does is to see if this concept of goal causation can be expanded to vegetative action...are there essential similarities between the two that REQUIRE they be integrated into one concept. I think Clay wants to move on from goals to something else. Go ahead, Clay. Yeah. :) actually, what I said earlier, was that goals are down the road. To infer goal directed action, you have to be able to conclude that the end point of an action could not have been a product of mere chance or pure physical or automatic processes. Jim : Thanks for the clarification...do continue There's no real point in talking about them without the appropriate background. ok Dr. Binswanger takes what I consider to be a solid epistemological approach in dealing with the distinction between the vegetative and teh conscious.. Clay: What is the next point? He describes numerous examples along a continuum of living actions. Beginning with basic plant actions such as photosynthesis and leading ultimately to the rational actions of man. Starting from what we can be introspectively aware of, and then extending that to other people, then other animals, then plants and animals? Ah, the other way around. plants and animals = plants Ok.. Now I'm going to hesitantly move back to the subject of "goals" for a moment. Subetai: The continuum is from lowest form of life and up. However, our knowledge of teleological concepts does start with our introspection and gets extended to lower forms of life, as in your ordering. I haven't read the book, but I'm sure he gives a lot of good examples from ordinary life experience. Dr. B draws one last distinction in his first chapter.. The distinction between goal-directed and purposeful actions.. Purposeful actions involve choice, then? Nope. Though that is the model example. What is the difference, then? purposeful acts involve awarenes of outcome ? Ah, is that it? Is it correct to say that actions that have as their consequence some state, have that state as their "goal"? Isn't that almost a human-centric projection of ends upon blind natural forces? Dr. B at this point introduces the idea of "ends-in-view" I think "purpose" is short term, while "goal" is long term. "Purpose" is required when goals aren't programmed, such as for plants. It involves relating the choices available at the time to the goal. So purposeful actions apply to conscious entities. Oh.. and tktad basically has it. That makes sense. yeah A man recognizes that he needs to eat and he purposefully acts to get some food. So then what is a goal, vs. a purpose? I think you could fit that into what I said. A dog sees a bone purposeful wouldn't apply to a dog, would it, a dog does not 'think' after i eat i shall no longer be hungry, it eats to satisfy the hunger, unaware of the consequnces ? The dog has the bone as a conscious "end-in-view when it goes to get it.. Tad: of course purpose applies to animals -- they are not automatons Purpose would apply to the dog. In oder to relate the choices you have at any given moment to a goal, you have to be aware of the consequences of your action. tad is right that the dog doesn't "think" Does purpose apply to the dog? I don't think so unless you broaden the scope as the term is used for humans. Subetai: Dr. Binswanger's distinction between purpose and goals is not based on short term vs. long term, but on whether there was a conscious awareness of the outcome (purposeful), or not (goal). Plants act towards a goal without being aware, while some animals and humans act with awareness. But the dog is indeed aware of its hunger pangs. tad: It sees the bone, recognizes its hunger, weighs the potential act of eating the bone, projects that to be pro-life, and makes a bee-line for the bone. Tad: isn't satisfaction of hunger a consequence? And the dog is aware that previous eating has ended its hunger pangs. Tom: Animals are as completely aware of their senses, the world, the entities within it, and their internal physical states, as humans. Seth when does a dog typically stop eating ? When the food's gone. They pursue ends to satisfy values, according to a hierarchy. It is merely all confined to a perceptible scale. Dr. B distinguishes between perceptual and conceptual purposes. TomM: Binswanger does apply the concept of 'purpose' to the actions of higher animals, but then distinguishes between conceptual awareness and non-conceptual awareness. Jim: I understand that, but I'm looking at it from another perspective. Isn't it true that purpose is required (metaphysically speaking) when a living entity has more than one possible way of acting in a given circumstance, and must therefore relate its current options to its long term goal, which is maintaining its life? Animals have memory of past actions/consequences. Seth, right. Ok, i got the distinction he is using. Sube: They're not always conscious of the goal. In fact, they're not. Jim: For instance, a plant doesn't face such a situation. It'll always act in the same way, given the same situation. Seth: It doesn't have to be conscious of its goal any more than a plant has to be conscious of it. However, just as we can see that a plant's actions lead to the end of sustaining its life, we can see that an animal fulfilling a purpose Isn't more a matter of pleasure/pain? I am still very dubious about this notion of "goal" being applied to natural action of plants and living things. Does a fertilized egg have growing into an adult of the species as its "goal"? BradA do propose that dogs , and higher animals weigh, consciously choose which actions to take , make a distinction between the most appropriate actions to take ? Brad: That's why we're differentiating between goal and purpose. Subetai: Well, Dr. Binswanger does apply the concept of 'purpose' to non-volitional actions. While higher animals do have alternatives, they do not volitionally choose one over the other. HOwever, it is that they first are conscious of the goal of their action that is considered purposeful action. Jim, good. Seth: It will stop eating under many conditions: when the food is gone, when it is sated, when there is still enough for its young, sharing with a mate, etc. Okay. Goal applies to an egg becoming a fully living being in that the egg is set upt to become that living being by it's own nature. Sube: i was just making sure you weren't attributing goal-consciousness. Jim, it's the idea of ends-in-view that gives us the scope for the concept of "purpose" Brad: Your hesitation to apply the notion of 'goal' to vegetative actions is part of what Dr. Binswanger's book is about. He demonstrates why that concept must be expanded to include vegitative actions. We're just at the beginning of the (other than in the short-term) Seth: I would challenge the claim that animals act without being aware of the goal -- that is almost a non sequitur -- it means goal directed action without a goal. that's not true. It means goal-directed action without consciousness of it. Like plants or any other sub-humans. 'goal-oriented action' describes an action viewed by a conceptual consciousness, it does not mean or imply any awareness on the part of the entity in question Tad: Of course they do -- have you never had an angry animal confronting you? It was probably deciding between attacking you, and retreating. An animal would decide between playing around, and foraging for food. etc. The question, it seems to me... is whether goal=purpose or if there is a reason to describe conscious actions as purposful(and goal-directed) and plant actions as merely goal-directed? But they decide only on a concrete, emotional level, based on their basically wired in value structure, which is an unquestionable absolute to them. BradA: We'll see Dr. Binswanger's justification for calling vegetative action 'goal-directed', as we proceed. Brad: Exactly. Brad then it is not a decision in the 'human' sense Animals don't make decisions, and they don't have emotions. That is perhaps the most important difference between man and animals -- we program our value system, and can be aware of it. To animals, it is just a given. Like many humans. :) animals To be aware of the 'end' requires a human level of abstraction. Seth, to conceive of the end requires abstraction. animals don't make decisions, and they don't have emotions. All actions have consequences. Consciousness, or levels thereof differentiate between consequences and purpose. It just seems that our vocabulary expands periodically with more terms which are only subtly different: different levels of conscious awareness. But a dog that sees a bone and remembers that a bone tasted good before is quite capable of perceiving the end. Even if it can't grasp the concept of "end" Sorry, I thought my system wasn't working correctly. Didn't mean to pond the point like that. Clay: I mean in terms of the awareness that what one does has an effect, not only on one's temporary state, but one's ability to continue sustaining one's life. Animals have emotions. seth: re animals being automatons -- I would suggest that observation of animals in reality should provide unassailable refutation of that notion Seth, are you saying that the dog doesn't know it's trying to stay alive? I think Clay proved that one can be aware of some ends by simple perceptual correlation. No abstraction required. Clay: Yes. Seth, then I agree. It's not that savvy ;) Sorry, my wording was too complex. This basically covers the material in Dr. Binswanger's first chapter... Lupin: Abstraction comes into play when you speak of humans. Conceptual abstraction, that is. Tom: Animals have emotions. This fact has even been stated in Rand's magazines. See "Biology Without Consciousness -- And Its Consequences", from Feb/68 I'd like to continue with his second chapter. There is a sense one can say higher animals are natural hedonists. They go towards the thing that most gives them pleasure according to their memory of past events. Right. BradA: I don't think she ever said animals have emotions. The second chapter addresses alternative positions on vegetative actions.. Tom: And they make conscious decisions between competing alternatives. Ex. a dog that "messes up" inside the house, will forlornly mope up to its master when he gets home, being aware of having made a dissaproved choice. We only call them "emotions because we are aware of them. Tom: Ideas have to come from observation of facts, not derivation from abstract ideology. Brad: re: the dog. It only will if it has learned through previous experience that messing in the house is bad. Sure. Every emotion comes from some knowledge. Also, because we can perceive them and group them based upon their common attributes. That requires conceptualization. (Lupin) Thus, as we are aware of these emotions, unlike our dog, we can choose to ignore them or go be hedonists. Puppies, for instance do not act "mournfully" when they mess on the florr. it is only after the animals has experienced punishment for such action that it connects the act to the pain, and "mourns" afterwards. and it does not equate the pain of punishment as against its standard , it own life well lived, but merely the remeberance of the unpleseantness of the punishment Dr. B describes the two basic groups with positions on vegetative action as the "Mechanists and the Teleologists" Lupin: Not only that, but we can see which emotions are actually in synch with the sustenence of life. Naturally. :) Lupin: Animals are aware of their emotions, in the sense they experience them consciously, but not in the sense of forming abstractions of them, as we do. Just observe a dog pining for its master to come home, then being overjoyed when he finally arrives. He basically describes the mechanists as believing that in spite of any apparent purposefullness in vegetative actions, that it is too different from purposefulness to place it in the same category. animals have a pleasure/pain mechanism, and are aware of the fact it's master takes care of it. Brad: Realy? THey act on them, but do they know what they're acting on or why? The mechanists basically hold that the only ends are "ends-in-view" Clay: it= goal-directedness? Sube: I would clarify that, as long as "knowledge" was understood to include the kind of concrete knowledge that animals possess of the relation between certain kinds of concretes, and certain consequences. Seth, it=vegetative action. Okay. Clay: As an aside, does he mention Dawkins at all? Lupin: Not necessarily, but they still experience them. Seth: That was my whole point. Tom: And the mental pleasure/pain mechanism IS emotion. Brad, I don't think so, I think Dawkins is more of a popularizer, and this may predate Dawkinds book. k Emotions are psychosomatic responses to some (subconscious) evaluation made by an organism. Animals like dogs can and do evaluate circumstances that affect them. Through some simple, wired-in mechanism, but nevertheless they do evaluate. And Clay and everyone else... Sube: Do you mean evaluate, as in feel pleasure and remember having felt pleasure? But let's get back to what Clay's saying. Moderated discussion is still in progress. Okay Lupin: As someone mentioned earlier, animals are the ultimate hedonists, and act on that which they feel to be most pressing to their needs. Because they have such limited or no capacity to ALTER their basic value hierarchy, this is fine for them. Dr. Binswanger describes the other category as Teleologist. Subetai: It seems that the animal puts all evaluations in the frame of its emotional hard-wiring. He holds himself as a member of this group. According to teleologist "Living action is goal-directed." What's specific about this group? Clay: My concern, is to attribute ends to processes which simply occur naturally, and result in those ends. It seems a fine point, but is important. ok Brad: Perhaps I misspoke, but that was exactly my point. By "ends in view" earlier, you mean ends as known consciously by an organism? Clay: the mechanists, then, are oppossed to the idea of including vegetative action within the concept of 'goal-directed', while the teleologists (such as Binswanger) say it is important to include them. TomM: Yes. ok, thanks. Jim, the mechanists, as I understand it, would equate goal and purpose. They would say that the only goals are purposeful goals. Clay: I thought you said the mechanists did not include vegetative action in "purposefulness." It isn't, of course. Ah. So because they don't distinguish between goal and purpose, the mechanists apply the definition of purpose to plants, see that it doesn't fit, and reject the notion that vegetative actions are goal-directed? Clay: Right. vegetative action to the mechanists, even though it takes place within living organisms, belongs in a category with inanimate processes. Subetai: Yes. Subetai, right. What's their justification for that? Clay: Thanks for clarifying. You should've said "goal-directedness." That is, why do they say that goals must be purposeful or else they're not goals? Sounds like a stolen concept.... They don't have the connection as to how automatic functions can be described as having a goal. Ah. They would say... Subetai: The Mechanists see the distinction between conscious and non-conscious action as most essential. Jim: So what's their definition of a goal? "The idea that a plant gets sunlight when it turns its leaves towards the sun is fine... It's an important distinction, but not the only one. Subetai: So a concept that dismisses this distinction is invalid in their view. but to the mechanists, they would not say that the plant turns its leaves toward the sun for an end. Subetai: Their definition of 'goal' is purpose, which involves conscious awareness. The mechanists' definition of a goal is "a purposeful course of action taken by an entity which is aware of its outcome"? The teleologist will try to prove that the plant somehow tries to get sunlight because the sunlight serves the goal of furthering its life. Ah. That would leave out most living things, then. Subetai : aware of and/or desires the outcome.. Subetai, aware of the potential outcome, but yes. Subetai: Yes. So they consider this as fundamentally different than vegetative actions. Those plants do; the other ones are dead. heh Within the teleological school of thought there are two basic schools.. The Vitalists, and the Emergentists.. Then this gets back to the distinctions we were drawing earlier between the living and non-living. According to the Vitalists, Clay: Does one of those fall under the heading of "universal teleologists," like some of the ancient Greeks? Okay. So in effect the difference between the two is in whether or not they consider life to be a goal. The mechanists say it's a goal only if the animal is potentially aware of it as a goal, the teleologists say that it's a goal so long as the animal's actions lead that way. Seth: Right, the teleological school holds the distinction between living and inanimate action as most essential. Jason, no.. though we can talk about that later too. If you ignore that distinction, you're going to ignore the existence of non-purposive goal-directedness. OK. I won't pursue it now, then. I have seen 'goal' defined as being with awareness and without... Where are we now? Subtai... your formulation of the teleologist position is not accurate. Correct it, then. Lupin: Good point. Goals exist for all living entities. WEll, some vegetative actions don't lead toward life at all.. for example... the thumping sound your heart makes. Purpose only exists for conscious entities. (conscious of goal) The thumping is incidental. Thank you. If we get that far this evening, chapter 3 discusses purposeful action in depth. Subetai: I would say that for the mechanists, the dividing line for 'goal-directed' action is between the conscious and the non-conscious. For the teleologists the dividing line is between the living and the inanimate. Clay: It's not purposeful, it's a by-product of goal pursuit. (the thumping) Another thing Sube... I'm not sure I understand that. The action is the beating of the heart. The sound it makes is one of the consequences, but not a relevant consequence in that it doesn't lead to fulfilling the plants goals. I'd say that the beating of the heart is goal directed. the issue of teleology really focuses on vegetative actions.. Subetai: the beating of the heart is, but not the noise it makes per se. It's clear to everyone that conscious actions are teleological. Sube: as would I. Its purpose is to pump blood through the body. The noise is incidental. Sube: Not for plants, tho.. Where is this leading to, btw? Tom: There are probably no isolated actions. Don't both mechanists and teleologists focus on some essential nature of an action, rather than rejecting it as goal directed because some of its consequences might be irrelevant? At this point and on my present understanding... I will say that the teleologists hold that *some* vegetative actions are goal-directed. Because if you did that, you'd have to reject just about every action as goal directed. Like what? Real obvious ones? Oh... the teleologists. What would they hold as being non-goal-directed? The sound of the heart is due to the beating, but the sound does not add anything to the live providing beating of the heart, as i understand it. That's obvious. Is there some aspect of the relationship between the mechanists and the teleologists that is unclear? No. And it's true of just about every action, in that every action has some irrelevant consequences. Therefore, whether you're a mechanist or teleologist, you have to focus on some essential element of the action. However, what vegetative actions would not be considered goal-directed? Seth, the obvious example would be inanimate processes. As far as with regard to vegetative actions... that will be addressed later. It's clear, Clay. I think I've got it. Clay: Those processes are still goal directed, unless you mean chemical reactions, etc.. Seth, a rock falling is goal-directed? Are there any goals outside of self-continuation/ Ah... I didn't think that was considered "vegetative action." The teleologists basically have two camps.. The Vitalists and the the Emergentists. Seth, it's not. chemical reactions are still purposive, though, (within the context of living things) since they're not externally triggered, right? That's what you were talking about, tho. What's the difference between the Vitalist and Emergentist position? Do the emergentists focus on life as an emergent property, while the Vitalists don't? The Vitalists hold that goal-directedness somehow transcends the laws governing physical matter. Good point, Sarah. I think everyone is probably pretty sure that Dr. B is not a Vitalist. Dr. B is an "emergentist" Ah. So the Vitalists view life as some entity in itself, apart from the organism that possesses it, while the emergentists view life as an emergent property of the organism's physical makeup? well, given that *nothing* transcends the laws governing physical matter, I'd say, no, he's an emergentist. :-) Sounds sound. Emergentists regard goal-directedness as an emergent property of matter. Lupin: not outside that context, no. They regard goal-directedness as occuring in the "whole qua whole" Clay: can you explain: "an emergent property of matter"? I really like Dr. Binswanger's comment: "...teleological causaiton on the vegetative level is not an _alternative_ to mechanical causation--rather, teleological causation is a complex _form of_ mechanical causation." Yep. I have to quote this.. <> Sarah takes a minute to digest this... Since goal-directedness is a characterstic of living entities, according to both camps of teleologists, can you replace "goal-directedness" with "life" in that sentence, and say that they're fundamentally arguing over the nature of life (whether it's emergent or some supernatural essence)? Jim: the trouble with that is that mechanical causation generally means inanimate action, unless binswanger explained his terms better. Basically. "By an emergent property I mean a property possessed by the whole qua whole and is not possessed by the parts." Well... It's potential exists in the possible arrangement of its constituents. TomM: He does elaborate. He says that: "According to the emergentist conception, the mutually exclusive terms are not 'mechanical' and 'teleological,' but rather '_merely_ mechanical' and 'teleological-mechanical.'... its Ok, I can buy the clearification for the time being. Trouble is, it's difficult to imagine how a mechanical action can lead to volition. TomM: he gives an example: "The movement of a rock falling down a hill, for instance, is merely mechanical--there is no teleological dimension to the process' the action of cell division, on the other hand, is, for the emergentist teleologist, both mechanical and teleological.' Seth, the idea is that the potential exists in the parts, but they have to be put together right to get at life. Right. Tom: He says this after describing himself as of the emergentist position. <> BradA has had his session crow alarm go off Seth, and furthermore, that the whole of parts assembled exhibits unique properties as a result of being together. TomM: Well, the subject of volition is down the road. Here, he's just arguing that it leads to life. (I recall that he does raise is issue of volition later in the book, but I'm not positive on this.) I imagine the VItalist school goes back to the Greeks Yes, I was just clarifying. TomM: The issue that volition could emerge, that is. Clay: I take that as a "yes" to my previous question. Hi BG I can accept cell division as a form of mechanical action, but unless I do some major revisions in my concept of "mechanical," I can't fit volitional action into mechanical action. Hi Seth Mechanical here just means "caused" Tom: that's a whole other discussion... ..er much later on in this one, anyway.. TomM: This issue is this. Cell division is not _merely_ mechanical, but does involve a mechanical process. As to whether volition _involves_ a mechanical process, that would be another topic. All actions are caused by the nature of the entity. I'm simply saying on my level of understanding, for the time being my concept of mechanical is not broad enough to include volition. ok Jim: Volition comes into play in teleology. Ok.. (Just much later on) I think there are some important things to note at this point.. Relating the Mechanists and the Vitalists to the Emergentists... Volition is a feature of a certain type of consciousness, and like that consciousness, it can't be reduced to a mechanical level although it has a physical basis to it like everything else. HBL's discussion. Seth: Yes. My point was if Binswanger discusses whether Volition is an emergent property of mechanical processes or not. Other than that, Binswanger definately discusses volition in the book, such as when discussing human purposeful action. Okay. The Emergentists and teleologists agree about the metaphysical status of vegetative actions but disagree about its goal-directedness. While the Emergentists and Vitalists agree about it's goal-directedness but disagree about its metaphysical status. doh. That should read... Emergentists and Mechanists. Clay: Right. I want to make one more point and then I'm going to have to end the formal discussion though we can certainly continue informally... There are two schools of thought within the Emergentist school. I'm going to have to read that book. me too. One holds that since vegetative actions are mechanical, that teleological concepts are "excess baggage" Tom and I ordered it last week. TomM: I highly recommend it. Binswanger does an excellent job with these issues. I've heard that a lot, just haven't taken to time to read the books I already have ;) The other holds that vegetative actions have distinct properties which warrant the use of teleological concepts to describe them. It all hinges on what one means by "mechanical." If it means caused, then i have no problem with it, but thne it seems overly broad. Tom: An action may be both caused and goal-directed, though. Seth, exactly. Seth: Sure, no problem thee. That's the point. oops, there. I just turned 40, and I'm already loosing my mechanical skills ;) One group says.. "It's convenient to describe them as goal-directed" So the first category of emergentists seem to view life as the essential characterstic of goal directed action, but turn around and then reject goal-directed action as excess baggage? Well, what Binswanger ultimately defines IS the nature of goal-causation. The other says.. "No, there are real properties there which warrant describing them that way. Sube: That's what it sounds like. I prefer 'goal-causation" over "mechanical." Tom: There's no need to differentiate. One can exist as a subset. Actually, in this context, using mechanical makes much sense. Actually, the subset idea is probably a good one. b/c there is a whole school which rejects teleology altogether and says "It's just mechanical." Clay: What does that breed say about volition? Tom, don't know, don't care. But they've already acknowledged something else that distinguishes those things from inanimate things. Ah, okay. So the first category is those who're naming the facts, but afraid to draw a conclusion about reality from them. That is, they recognize goal-directedness as the differentiating characterstic of a living entity's actions, but then say it's just a convenience to help them categorize, but says nothing definite about what the actions really are? Regardless of their being caused. Subetai: Sounds like a nominalist problem. Sube: Right. Tom, right. There's actually a category of mechanists that rejects teleology outright. But then there are the emergentists who are either nominalists or those who recognize the facts. There is a lot of evidence certain aspects of living beings are mechanical, such as the possibility of transplanting organs. My heartbeat is mechanical. Sure. I think we can consider the formal discussion closed at this point. It went on for quite awhile. :) Thanks, Clay. :) Clay: Thanks for the discussion! Thanks, Clay. I'm looking forward to the next instalment. I hope to be able to continue.. Clay: It has been a long time since I read the book. I enjoyed reviewing it again. Clay : Thanks thanks, Clay. :-) Clay: Thanks. My crow was getting overloaded as well. Old age is creeping in ;) I wish I'd been here from the beginning. Clay: Thanks so much. (and thanks to Jim_N and Subetai too, for their especially valuable points) Thanks all. Jason, ask about the Greeks. Tom: I don't think it has to do with age. I'm 23 and I was just hanging on for dear life. :-) Good to see the discussions back. Sarah: i was only joking. Never been 40 before ;) :) Next time, I think I will focus on Dr. B's analysis of purposeful actoins in Ch. 3 and make that the whole of the discussion. yeah, we plan to continue TomM: Wow: 40. Maybe we'll get to free will eventually... He uses his conception of purposeful actions to provide a framework for drawing the comparison with vegetative actions. Well, I've been listening to Peikoff's History of Philosophy and he talks about the universal teleologists. BTW everyone, I'll be up next week, in a discussion of rights, "Concrete Rights"