Welcome to #GeekSpeak. Before we begin, I'd like to remind you that all channel logs are the copyright of the channel owners: Pankaj Saxena and Tom Wright. Logs may not be redistributed in any form without the prior consent of the channel owners. Tonight's discussion is on "Is/Ought and Volition", and will be moderated by Tym Parsons. As usual, the discussion will be conducted in keyword-protected mode. If you see someone off-channel whom you think would like to join the discussion and would not be disruptive, please message me or Wright. Suppose someone had the opportunity to live a long happy life but chose not to. Is this person morally blameworthy? Not a rhetorical question btw. Dig in all :) Tym: Actually chose not to? why would they make that choice? Jim: right I would say in general, yes, assuming the opportunity was there and all else being equal. Tym: Knew how but didn't do it? I don't understand the question. Jim: right Tym: It would depend on the reasons for his choice segelbe: you yr OBLIGATED to live, even if you don't want to? =you mean yr I would say that the choice to live is the precondition of all other moral evaluation. we are going with the assumption that this person *recognized* the opportunity and saw it for the value it is? FredG: expalin explain even :) Tym: For example, a test pilot might choose a potentially very short life for the experience of flying the greatest planes I never said "obligated". But someone who deliberately chooses to mess up his life is morally blameworthy. Brad: but wouldn't that make morality contingent on an ARBITRARY decision? But if he chose not to fly the great planes, then he wouldn't be as happy, right? segelbe: good point I would think it would be of no consequence - unless it had a negative effect on the people around him. Segelbe: Right - that would be immoral for him to do given his passion to fly. (unless death was certain, of course) Tym: I also would say that it depends on his reasons. If he gained something he considered to be greater by not living that happy life (eg the enactment of some policy/life's work/etc) then they would not be blamworthy segelbe: So he chose the happiest life he could. Thank you. You did say that the opportunity is there for a long *happy* life, right? Perhaps "long, happy life" in unnecesssarily qualified. How about changing that to just "happy life". please explain moral. Tym: Wouldn't it be more accurate to describe the decision to live as axiomatic, rather than arbitrary? I'm not sure I understand your question... Sube: I wanted to start out with the strongest case. is it someone who lives miserably vs. successfully, or is it someone who doesn't live, vs. someone who does? Would it be possible for him to chose a potentially short but extremely happy life over a longer but still happy life? BradA: How could a decision ever be axiomatic??? I think we have to separate biological life from "life" as defined as maximization of one's happiness. Big diff. Brad: here's how Peikoff framed the question rhetorically: Okay, but it runs into the problem of dangerous but enjoyable professions. are you saying "give up" FredG: The decision to live is basically axiomatic, in that remaining in existence is a choice which has no further justification. "what is the status of someone who chooses not to live? Isn't the choice of suicide as llegitimate as any other, so long as one acts on it?" BradA: there's a big difference between just "remaining alive" and choosing to "live". OK. I want to emphasise here that what I'm talking about is the *perfect* idealised life. We're not going to get into long or short issues etc. The thing I'm trying to get you all to concentrate on is the ideal life and someone refusing it. What is his moral status and why? Tym: I would only say it were legitimate if a person were truly convinced that there was no chance of achieving value from existence through their effort. Does this person recognize fully the choice open to him? That may or may not be caused by their own choice. BradA: But the context of the question is that it is possible to achieve, but he choose not ot. ot = to I see Brad's point. Axiomatic means "self-evident" or that which requires no extra validation. The choice to live is similar in that one needs to extra validation to live. Tym: Because the standard of morality is the life of the indidual, I would judge anyone who acted against their own life as immoral. Brad: no. I'm saying he CAN. Is he immoral for not doing so? to extra = no extra Tym: I think I get your point. Do you mean that if someone saw that their perfect ideal life was attainable yet chose not to take it, would that person be blameworthy - I say yes. FredG: doesn't that destroy the is/ought basis of ethics and values? Subetai: A decision is not axiomatic - if it were, this would be an argument for determinism I think Tym: Yes. Morality is the science of living life. Acting against the needs of one's life is what immorality is. Therefore, such a person is immoral. Tym: He is immoral since he's not acting to live in reality, achieve his values, nor achieve his self-esteem. He's betraying reason, purpose and self-esteem, and is thus immoral. Jim: so what??? Why should he care? Fred: Perhaps axiomatic is the wrong term -- maybe irreducible might be a better choice. Tym: What is the is/ought basis of ethics? If he doesn't care about value as such, then you're right. So what? YOu don't choose to live to satisfy some other purpose, choosing to live is a choice in itself. Fred: That's why I'm saying it's "similar". This is a very particular decision, not just any decision. Fred: Rand made it clear that ethics is contingent: if x is the case, then you ought to do y...if life is the ultimate value, you ought to do what it takes to sustain it. Tym: That wasn't your original question. It doesn't matter if he cares, it matters if we have a standard of morality. He's immoral by the standard of man's life, and there is not other standard of judging the value of actions. Tym: He should care, because he lives. The only consistent choice is to live or refrain from living. Tym: if life is *your* ultimate value, then yes. But not everyone holds life as one of their values. Brad: so it's really a matter of *consistency*? Tym: Are you saying that my statement about morality is counter to Rands view of ethics? Tym: your senario is bizzare and implausible. the reason people give up pursuing values (wanting to live) is that they feel that values and happiness are unattainable. FredG: I'm not saying either way. I'm just asking questions. What "standard" are we putting to this person, would he hold life as the standard? segelbe: Then they are trying to achieve a contradiction: they *do* choose life, implicitly, by not dying, yet they repudiate that upon which their life truly depends. They want their life, and their anti-life. They want life... and death. And look at them. Tym: It's a matter of living. He he doesn't choose to live, he's betraying the source of values. He's thus immoral. ...*Nobody who saw that happiness is attainable would give it up. joe: familiar with Peikoff's decription of the "most depraved man" in OPAR? that would be the man without a purpose of his own, right? Tym: I will look it up. page ref? joe: p.248 ok What was the question? I came in late. that's the man who "embraces a zero for its own sake". Tym: In the sense that the issue doesn't arise for those who are consistent, and cease living. Ethics is for the living. The ethical status of a dead man is fairly irrelevant to that man. I think it would help to re-state the question. Sube: k. Hold on all Since ethics is based on metaphysics (every "is" implies an "ought"), one says that "if you choose life/happiness, you must do this". Tym's asking about the is/ought status of the decision to choose life. Where is the "is" that makes ... Is Rand's characterisation of ethics being "if you don't want to live you don't need "oughts"" (not her words) a "hypothetical imperative leading to subjectivism"? the "man ought to choose life". Tym: i looked up the section. Nowhere does LP state thatthis person understands that happiness is possible. I reiterate, your question is implausible. Do I understand what you're saying, Tym? Are you trying to establish the basis of man's life as the standard? Sube: no. I'm asking whether that makes ethics turn on an "arbitrary" decision. TomM: Tym has only asked us this: If a man had the oportunity to live a long and happy life, but chose not to, what would be him moral status. TomM: We started asking about shorter, but better lives, etc. Tym then said, if a man had the opportunity to live an ideal life, but chose not to, etc. Tym: That's what I said. If you know the "is" that makes that "ought" it's no longer arbitrary. JimN: cut out the "long" part since it only confuses the issue. joe: he implies it. That's why he's saying such a man is depraved. Re: Subetai's remarks, I think the only experience any individual has is of his own response to life. I could imagine circumstances in which pain and disease might obviate the possibility of experiencing positive response to the fact of life. Brad: no, that's not at issue here. If a man simply gives up, without effort, the ability to live happily, then on that basis one would have to conclude he is being arbitrary and immoral. Ok. but then suicide becomes the only alternative to hell. That's not the issue. Sube: but doesn't that make ethics CONTINGENT? How can you then blame a man for whatEVER decision he made? BradA: But that's not the context of Tym's question. Put it this way, there is not barrier but the person's choice. He chooses not to live an achievable good life. What is his moral status? Tym: Ethics IS contingent. I disagree Tim. As i read it, in no way does he imply that. Tym: Ethics *is* contingent on the decision to choose life. Tym: Can we move on to real issues that imagining this depraved person? that = than Sube: so if you DON'T choose life, then yr neither to be praised nor blamed? Why start with depravity if "mans' life as the standard" has not yet ben established as rational? Remeber the point in Atlas Shrugged when Taggart was considering suicide as one option to the mess he'd gotten him and TT into? I think this directly relates to that incident, doesn't it? Jim: probably want to hold off on discussing the depraved man. Tym: I don't know about moral blame, if one acts consistently on his action to die. I'd wonder why life was not a value to that person. Tym: ok, ignore everything I said, I just re-read your question. I thought you had said that he was aware that happiness was possible. His consideration of suicide was as an escape from the consequences of his actions. Not the same at all. In his case, suicide would be a negation of honor, personal responsibility, etc. Even man's life as the standard does not preclude suicide...if that man can not achieve happiness, through no fault of his own, then suicide may be the only way out of his hell. Implicitly, man's life is still the standard. action = decision Tom: yr behind in the discussion Tym: I see no dillema. Can you state it explicitly? segelbe: But I'm pointing it out in emphasis of Tym's question -- is it ok to treat non-life as just another option in one's collection? TomM: You're right, but we set the context as it beign possible to achieve happiness, and the person chooses suicide. Brad: is/ought would "seem" to indicate that I think I just stated the "dilemma" Tym. You're asking if there's an "is" behind the "ought" that "man ought to choose life". And if there isn't, is that decision arbitrary. beign = being Sube: I guess we'd have to chew that. BradA: well, there's always the implicit choice to do oneself in. But non-life is not an option for someone who values "human life" as a desirable goal. If happiness was possible, and he chose death, then obviously he does not have man's life as his standard. His immorality would depend on how well he knew this issue and if he had severe psychological problems... Sube: what I'm asking is: if morality is contingent on the decision to live, doesn't that make morality subjective? Subetai: there is an "is" to that question: Man *is* a living being. Tom: is he OBLIGATED to stay that way? Tym: I don't understand the question. How does morality based on the standard of man's life become subjective? Tym: No, it's incorrect to look at it as an obligation. Tom: I'd go further and and say that not only is he a living being, but that life is a value unless conditions make it otherwise. He's obligated to be happy? that sounds awfully weird. Tom: most people here are saying it IS an obligation Sube: can life be a value if it's unchosen? obligated to whom? And the *is* really is the fact that life *is* a value unless conditions make it otherwise. Tym: No, it doesn't make it subjective. Morality is based on the fact that man's life requires principles. Because a person can choose not to live doesn't make the principles for how to live arbitrary. Most people here are saying nothing of the kind. It's an obligation only in the context of already having chosen life as the standard. Happiness is the psychological state stemming from achieving values. Thre's no obligation there, but it is his right to do so. Jim: so is a person who walks away from life in the manner I've just described morally blameworthy? Is that a meaningful claim even? Tym: Yeah, if you look at it in a developmental context. The pleasure-pain mechanism in infants sets them on that course. As they develop a conceptual consciousness, they find out implicitly that everything that makes them happy requires them to be alive to experience that happiness. That's an implicit "life is a value" premise. Tym: yes, if, in our scenario, he understands fully what he's walking away from, and only then. A person isn't obligated to be happy, but it is a virtue to be productive and be proud. A moral man seeks to achieve his values and be happy. Tym: I'd say he's morally blameworthy to just give up. I mean, you haven't even presented anything that would make his life difficult. man's life is the only rational standard, so, if he does not hold his own life as the standard he is irrational, and therefore, immoral by that standard. Tym: Yes, he is morally blameworthy in this context. The fact that morality is based on the choice to live doesn't mean that an anti-life choice can't be judged. By the standard of life, the choice is wrong. Is there a contradiction btw is/ought and the "obligation" to live? I am trying to relate the abstractness of this discussion, to the concerns of my own existence. Tom: but values are only such if they're CHOSEN, right? Tym: I think the word "obligation" is a misnomer, since we're talking about chosen values, not assumed duties. Different beast entirely. Brad: good approach :) Tym: No. *If* man's life is the standard, and happiness is living a successful life, then it's not an obligation to be happy, but rather man's life as the standard and acting consitantly with this standard, then happiness will be achieved. Tym: Values must be chosen, but they ought to be chosen withing what is possible to a rational being. within Since life is a value, the decision to choose life isn't subjective. Life is an *objective* value. Tom: you mean values can be IMPOSED and not chosen? TomM: that sentence makes no sense. How else should they be chosen? I'm confused. Tym: I didn't say that...I said values are *objective*...choice can not over-ride the fact that he is alive. Tym: While the Objectivist ethics is based on Causality, "If you want ... then you should...", that doesn't mean that a person is off the hook when he does something bad, by just saying, "Well, I didn't want to achieve anything, so don't hold it against me." I believe what Tym is getting at is the moral status of a man who does not accept life as the standard... is accepting life as the standard a subjective decision? Sube: so values must be BOTH recognised as objective, AND chosen? segelbe: It is possible to have some other standard...but any other standard can not achieve happiness because man *is* a living being. Tym: Yeah. You recognize something as an objective value, then choose to act to achieve it. Tym: It is a virtue to act to achieve your values, and your life. To choose not to do so, when it is possible, is immoral. Jim: so a person's actions (or nonaction) have to be CONSISTENT with their avowed values? I think the confusion arises from the assumption that life may or may not be a value, that whether it is a value is arbitrary. But that's not so. Tym: that's rather like saying: "You have volition, and you have no choice in the matter." Which is *not* a dilemma. or a paradox JimN: I'd even amend that to say that to choose not to at least attempt to achieve your values in any time is immoral, since every rational man must always make the "best of any situation," in the non-statist sense. A man can choose life as his standard, or he does not. We can consider the latter as not good because it rejects life, which is the only thing which gives "value" any meaning. tym: No, morality judges whether they are choosing to act in accordance with the requirements of their life as a man. If they are choosing not to, they are immoral. hi all. hi Midas John: Right. There can be no values ouside of the context of a living being. A rock or a dead man has no values lively discussion in progress? Tym: Er, I meant that I was trying... and not having much success. :) Any standard other than man's life is neglecting the facts of existence. woops. guess that's not the minimize button. Let me ask the question another way: So long as values are achievable, why would a man chose to remain alive? TomM ah the "is " and morality the ought tk: Yes. Tym: Is that what you are asking? Of course other values are contingent on life. The question is, what is the decision to choose life contingent on. My answer is that it's contingent on the fact that life itself is a value. That's the default for a human being, unless ... Tom: that's one way of putting it :) conditions make it otherwise. hi Eriks Tym: Ok, now I think I think i know where you are going with this. Howdy. :-) He would chose to remain alive because values are achievable...it's self-sustaining in that sense. TomM: To exist. A living being can only exist by choosing to pursue the values his life depends on. Not to do so is to go out of existence. tomM: to achieve those valuse naturally And self-justifying as well. Is it true that "the choice to live..is the choice to accept the realm of reality...this choice is not only NOT arbitrary. It is the precondition of criticising the arbitrary"? Tym: Yes. Tym: The Objectivismt code of morality is the only one consistent woth the facts of existence...how in the world can that be arbitrary? Jim: does that resolve the "dilemma"? with Of course. Have you ever seen a dead man criticize the arbitrary? Tym: Yes, but I didn't grasp it as a dilemma. ;) Jim ;) Is the arbitrary ever based on facts??? Tym to choose to live , for a volitional being, means to actively pursue understanding of the type of being one is and the requirements such a being would need to exist TomM: please explain that statement. er, question. Tom: philosophy is just a temporary neurosis ;) The arbitrary, by definition, is a statement with no connection to the facts. Tom: the facts in question tho are the philosophical POSITIONS that some people have articulated. Tym: I think what you may be getting at is that every other morality is arbitrary -- yes? Tom: no...altho that would be consistent with it. The choice to live is not arbitrary, because it is a *fact* that man is a living being, and must do certain thing to remain that way. Tom: what I've been asking about is how morality and values are both chosen and objective (of necessity) Unfortunately, some moralities are based on false premises, not just arbitrary premises. You asked if ethics was ssubjective. It would be, if ethics was based on life as a standard, and choosing life was an arbitrary decision. It's not an arbitrary decision because life *is* a value unless one defaults on it. Tom: right re Eriks actually, that's fortunate. TO the extent it is based on falsehoods, there's a chance to correct it. Sube: I would put it this way: life is a value IF you choose it, but if yr actions are inconsistent with that, you can't really be said to have chosen life. And the converse holds too. Tym: I'd say life is a value because every memory of happiness (the state of experiencing something as a value achieved) is contingent on the fact that you were alive. Subetai: Values are those things which make life continuing possible. Life as a value is true, but only so long as it is possible to maintain it rationally. Life is what makes value possible. Thanks, Tom. Don't see where it fits in with what I said, but it rings true. Sube: the converse is: if you SAY you don't value life, yet choose to act as tho you do (albeit inconsistently) you STILL can't be said to value life. Tym: Sure. I'll go with that. you could also be said to not "get' valuing and why it is important both contradictory states are also known as hypocrisy. {hey Paul} Summing up: a person is morally blameworthy IF his actions are inconsistent. The point was "what is the thing that makes ethics not subjective" - and the answer is "because life is a value". Tym: well, you can't fully say you value life if you don't hold man's life as the standard, because those "values" are metaphysically impossible. Tom: exactly by stating that you value life but don't hold man's life as the standard you also invalidate the concept of values itself. However, i'm not sure you can say a man is morally blameworthy if he does not have that standard...I mean, is it obvious? It's obvious because it's obvious that life is a value. Tom: he either has to adhere to that standard or not adhere to it. Either/or TomM: isn't there a big difference between someone who deliberately chooses to negate values and someone who believes that values aren't possible to achieve? (as in a depressed or defeated person.) ? Tym: that's true, but then you are implicitly saying anyone who does not hold life as the standard is being evasive...is that what you want to say? segelbe: Sure, but I'm not sure that is what we are discussing. TomM: Right. They are acting against the requirements of their life, but may be doing so out of ignorance of what their life requires, not necessarily due to evasion. Unfortunately, their lives are still at risk. Tom: if they don't hold life as the standard they don't need values. To answer that question myself, i would say it is implicitly obvious that man's life is the standard, but that it is possible to go wrong when one tries to make it explicit. Tym: They need values to remain alive, even if they don't hold life as the standard. E.g. a person believing that they must live to do the work of God (which they were indoctrinated to believe), but that his commandments are the standard, not his own life. Jim: that's what I had in mind. In one's formative years, many mistakes can be made, especially in more primitive cultures. In ours, if you don't choose life as the standard, i think some evasion is involved. are you saying adherents to zen buhdists , are aware of and reject O'ist morality , and are then morally blameworhty ? er ism tk: i'm saying even they can't refrain from being aware that they are alive and have requirements qua living being. TomM: There is also then the issue of identifying the principles that man's life requires. I'm glad Ayn Rand worked so hard to identify the essentials. K, I'm done. Most religions are indoctrinated evasive techniques...i.e. avoiding considering the fact that man is biological. Thanks, Tym. :) *most* religions? Floor's open to the same topic or others. segelbe: Well, some are better than others...I would certainly say Catholicism is better than Heaven's Gate ;) TomM: Right, evasive techniques encouraged by fear, i.e. to consider the issue is held as punishable by going to hell, etc. Thanks Tym :) Thanks for the discussion Tym. tq Tym. :) Tym: Merely as a comment, I think you started off the discussion on the wrong foot by asking the question the way you did before establishing man's life as the standard ;) but, thanks ;) Tym, if its not too much trouble, could you summarize the conclusions of this discussion? Thanks. Jim: Or the converse: Considering something else as the standard will get you infinite rewards after death. Or that GLORY consists in having a standard "higher than" man's biological life. Or if anyone else want s to . joe: the conclusion is that morality isn't contingent on an "arbitrary" decision to live, rather it's a RECOGNITION of the sort of thing that one is. joe: i think the conclusion was that since it is obvious that man is alive, accepting any other standard requires a certain amount of evasiveness. joe: i.e. it's both chosen AND non-subjective Has dealing with accusations of "that's the naturalistic fallacy" been mentioned? Legendre: Describe that fallacy. A wedge driven between is and ought. It is said that being a particular type of thing doesn't mean we ought to act according to that type of thing Tym, Tom: Thanks, much appreciated. Legendre: you man the natural vs something higher, like the supernatural? TomM: Yes. They say that since we have volition, we can choose *NOT* to be mere animals. Legendre: Those who think man has a "soul" other than the functioning of his consciousness? TomM: Ie, we can choose to ignore our own physical identity. Yes, that's typical of the start of most religions. I would like to bring a delightful film to everyone's attention: Strictly Ballroom. It is a fable about living by one's own standards and resisting the collective, in a story about a young ballroom dancer's desire to succeed. It was wonderful. Legendre: But the question then comes up: how should we act? Why do we need values anyway? Objectivism demonstrates that our need of values and morality stems from our nature as living beings. It wasn't rue of the Ancient Greek culture, by the way, which is why i said *most* religions. BradA: Yes, I enjoyed that movie. Jim_N: It came from people who were very familiar with Objectivist ethics. oops...wasn't true... Brad: it's a good movie. Legendre: Well, it's much older than that ;) Legendre: Not familiar enough, I guess. If they truely were familiar, in what way did they reject the dependence of values of life, and the requirements of man's life? I'm off to watch "Island of Dr. Moreau [sp?]" (new version). See y'all in a few. TomM: I figured, but that's where I first heard of it from. And I think they were more or less atheist as well. values of life = values on life Legendre: Don't know that one per se, but they may have been trying to say man is rational, not merely an animal? "is there law , without the father?" TomM: No way, they were actively abusive of me when I suggested that one's own interests should be one's standard of value