IRC log started Fri May 24 21:56 Welcome to #GeekSpeak. Before we begin, I'd like to remind you that all channel logs are the copyright of the channel owners: Pankaj Saxena and Tom Wright. Logs may not be redistributed in any form without the prior consent of the channel owners. Tonight's discussion is on Perception, and will be moderated by Clay Hellman. As usual, the discussion will be conducted in keyword-protected mode. If you see someone off-channel whom you think would like to join the discussion and would not be disruptive, please message me or Wright. Let's go, Clay. :) allright Ayn Rand defined perception as "a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which give it the ability to be aware, not of single stimuli(sensations), but of entities." Percepts are the epistemological foundation of Objectivism from which all other conclusions are derived. Ok, according to O'ism, perception is the foundation of all knowledge, why does O'ism hold this view? It's metaphysically given. Clay: Because it can clearly differentiate between "O'ism" and "Objectivism"? ;) Because perception is direct awareness of existence. You can't get any more basic than that. Because that's as far as you can go down the hierarchy of phenomena of consciousness. Percepts are formed automatically, and that's what you have to work with. Clay, O'ism is in opposition to mysticism: reality is nothing more than it is. so to speak. Clay: Because we have to deal with entities, and perception gives us that. Percepts are the means to grasping entities and thus units. Without grasping entities one could not form a concept. It's how we hold entities before we conceptualize them. ok, so all concepts we might form, are in some way reducible to a perceptual base. Any form of mysticism hold that there is something out there that defies sensory percpetion. but there is no basis for that. Clay, yes., ok, in regard to perception, what is the status of percepts, are they fallible or infallible, why? Clay: Since perception is automatic, it is infaliable. They are infallible--you have no choice on the level of perception. "Infallible" meaning "incapable of error"? Subetai: yes. The concepts "fallible" and "infallible" don't apply. Percepts are what they are. They are integrations of sense data. They are the basis for all proof--including any fallibility. ClayH: It's like a reflex--when you hit your knee, you kick ... This is the point of much contention between myself and though I would speak philosophically to: does each person perceive the same thing. I think yes, but interpretations can vary. though=those khronos: No, and that is not necessary for there to be communication. MikeH, in some sense, yes they aren't either. khronos: Interpretations occur on the *conceptual* not the *perceptual* level. khronos: differing personal perspectives on the same thing. Yes, that's where I was going MIke, right... Subetai said earlier that perception was direct awareness of reality, What exactly does it mean to be directly aware? Khronos, a means of consciousness cannot be invalidated because its a means of consciousness. Clay: It means that there is nothing interveining between yourself and existence. Perceptions depend upon the perceptual apparatus, and within the limitations of that apparatus, given its normal functioning, they are incapable of error. ClayH: It means to be aware of something on the PERCEPTUAL level ... as opposed to the conceptual level; such as grasping the concept of "solarsystem" The perceptual level is valid. ? TomM, what do you mean by "nothing interveneing? It is the next step up from they sensational level. It is what you grasp automatically from sensations. -y Clay: I mean that the senses keep you connected to existence via a causal chain of events not open to persuasion. ok, let's go back to something that was brought up a few minutes ago.. We've said that percepts were direct awareness of external objects and the foundation of our knowledge Directly aware meaning that what you are aware of lies within the capacity and resolution of your senses. For example, you cannot be directly aware of a bacterium, because it falls outside the limits of resolution of your eyes. All real knowledge is "direct" knowledge of reality, though. There is a distinction to be made between the perceptually given and the conceptually/epistemologically derived, though, which I think is a more useful distinction. <> BBWomanly creeps out of the room...will be back later Commonly, errors are made in regard to the nature of perception regarding things such as the stick in water appearing bent Or objects in the distance appearing smaller than objects that are close, even though they may be the same size. Subetai, right... the list could go on and on Subetai: However, the perspective is a good way of knowing it *is* far away. Tom: But that's conceptual knowledge. TomM: If you know how big the things you're seeing are supposed to be, yes. ClayH: That error is based on the sensory apparatus, not the percept. You need concepts to know about perspective and what it does. The concept of appearance is formed from the focus on the limited nature of our faculties of consciousness. Subetai: i disagree...one can tell perceptually that the one is close, and the other is far away. Tom: Right, but that doesn't explain why one appears smaller. ok, so these people see the stick in the water as being bent... what's wrong w/ their conclusion that their senses are invalid What epistemological error are they committing ? Subetai: Because the cones of light are different...granted, this can only be known conceptually. Clay: They are not integrating *all8 of the evidence...if they put their hand in, the stick would feel straight. ClayH: That your senses (or consciousness) has identity ... That they do not operate in a void. Sub, as an object moves away, it occupies and increasingly smaller portion of one's visual range, and then there is the depth perception from stereoscopic vision. Clay: They're committing the error of Empiricism, of expecting to "see" the conceptual knowledge that the stick isn't really bent through perceptual means. How did they arrive at such a conclusion? The validity of the senses must be appealed to implicitly. Koz_: if you mean ostensively, i agree. range=area MikeH, right... basically it's the fallacy of the stolen concept, only more fundamental, they steal percepts and conclusions arrived at by percepts to try to invalidate percepts They are not taking into account the form object distinction. They're expecting the senses to be magical, i.e., give them the "truth" regardless of physical laws. Betsy! Glenn, good point The naive realists, the people who think that seeing the stick bent in water means it *is* bent, are the other edge of the same side of the coin as the nominalists, who can't figure out why we don't see all the molecules in the wate and stick now that we know they're there. Subetai: However, the senses *do* give us physical laws. +r ok, I wanted to get to the form-object distinction here in just a sec first I want to provide a few examples to lead into it with Tom: Of course they do. But only after perceptions have been integrated and analyzed. Subetai: Nope...we perceive the physical law of optics at work in the examples of stick in water and perspective. Subetai: Just as we perceive gravity in that things feel heavy. TomM: We perceive the effects, but we don't perceive the *laws*. Mike: Ok. Yes, Tom. Light travels through different media at different rates. TomM: Correction -- we see _evidence_ of the existence from which we formulate physical laws. Tom: But we don't know what that law is and how refraction will do that, without a great deal of conceptual knowledge. These people are applying the results of that analysis to perceptions and complaining that the stick appears bent, therefore the senses lie. Ok... first example is brought to us courtesy of one of my history professors who says "You look at my suit and it looks black *to you*, but it's really blue, so your senses are distorting what they see.." Clay: By what standard is it *really* blue? Betsy: i agree...just wanted to emphasise that the senses give us existence...the laws are a conceptulization of what we perceive. A second example is an old skeptical argument, You have three pails of water, a cold one, a hot one, and a lukewarm one... you stick one hand in the hot, the other hand in the cold, then, after a few minutes you take both hands out of the buckets and stick them into the lukewarm water, and one hand feels hot and the other feels cold.... and they conclude that the senses are invalid h Clay: They ignore that there is contextuality even to perception. The perceptual-level is grasped as a particular form to each conscious entity. Other than the obvious fact that all of these examples are trying to invalidate percepts relying on other percepts, this gets into a deeper issue of how perception actually works They are using words that are comparitive "warmer' "colder", etc., and trying to give them an absolute measurement they do not possess. Clay: one hand is colder/hotter than the other...what it is measuring is the difference between its temperature and that of the surrounding. Their objections can be answered by explaining the form-object distinction Would someone care to take a shot at explaining it? The only method by which perception could be invalidated is if u "perceive" an entity that is not there. But in what "form" would that take? Clay: We perceive reality (object) by some means (in a particular "form") Form means the manner in which you are perceptually aware of some aspect of existence. The form that one perceives an object may vary. The object is the same, regardless of the form you perceive it. Helen Keller and a sighted person can come to the same concepts, even though they use different senses to perceive it. U would have to have a split between object-as-perceived in some form and identity of consciousness as identification. Well, Clay? He may be lagged. Can anyone ping Clay? I'm trying to think of how to ask this question We have many forms of perception.. [ClayH PING reply]: 14 secs ok Why is it we can perceive the same object by different means, and this doesn't raise a problem w/ the validity of perception? Because whatever the means, we are perceiving the same reality. clay: Each person perceives existence utilizing a different physical apparatus, but we all perceive existence. Because we are still perceiving the same object. Objects exist independently of perception. The senses are limited but valid. An entity has many attributes: shape, size, color, temperature, texture, etc. You sense different attributes with different senses. Can u image walking being considered ineffect because there are different paths? Clay: we have to percieve at least *some* of the same attributes of a given entity. Subetai: More than that...there's color-blindness...and a host of other differences that are irrelevant in the long run (philosophically). ... ineffective ... well, bye I really think everyone here is knows this stuff Each mode of perception tells you something about an entity. So long as there's no contradiction between what different senses tell you, there shouldn't be a problem. TomM: I think you're off base in your discussion (and I'd reply if I had time) but why would somebody break off contact over it? ok, I wanna move on to some other theories of perception... I think it will help clarify the O'ist position by showing what's wrong w/ the other guys Different modes of perception would have to be able to arrive at what was essential about an entity, for the same concept to be formed. Ok, first is Naive Realism Naive Realism has a good part and a bad part the good part is that it upholds the primacy of existence it says that there are objects external to consciousness Who knows what the bad part of Naive Realism is? Could you define it first, Clay? ok It considers perceptual consciousness to have no identity. The essence of the theory of naive realism is that consciousness is reproduction The "mirror" theory is an example of it. The idea is that consciousness somehow copies the external objects identically in an internal *form* The bad part is that Naive Realists say that what is essential about an entity, resides in the entity, and is somehow imprinted on consciousness. A metaphysical essence, Glenn? Yes. okay There is no need for the concept of appearance, and others like form. The bad idea here is that consciousness somehow copies its objects identically Clay: yes, that is a mistake...treating concepts as if they are percepts. The error is in thinking that concepts are automatically derived from the senses The Naive Realists make an a priori assumption about the way that perception *ought* to work TomM, and GlennM, yes, that is a further error that generally holds true in all realist theories of concepts We aren't talking about concepts here Well, except for those relevant to percepts, but not concept-formation, as such With a "perception" like that who would need concepts? ok... As Koz_ says. Naive Realism does away with any action by consciousness. (it's identity). I don't see what's wrong with it so far, unless they're saying that there's a little chair-like object inside our brains when we view a chair. Subetai: that is kinda what they mean. Perceptual consciousness is considered to be infinitely malleable. No object will go unperceived as is. Koz: But what does that mean? A concrete example, please. Subetai, yes, that is basically what they are trying to say there is a chair in reality, and it is somehow reproduced identically in your consciousness E.g., no matter what u did the object would be perceived in its totality. Naive realism says a stick LOOKS bent in water because it IS bent in water. It's still not clear. At the level of perceptions, there is some image of an entity in our minds when we perceive it. It's not a solid/material entity in our brains, but there *is* an image of it. Subetai, the point is this... that your perceptions are somehow **identical** copies of the external objects Betsy: So they're projecting their perception to reality, instead of the other way around? Subetai: Not really...we perceive the entity...*not* an image of the entity. and... Tom: I never said "we perceive an image of the entity". The Naive Realists, as I understand it, do think we perceive an image of the entity... am I wrong in this? I said "when we perceive an entity, there's an image of it in our brains". Sube: That image is a "percept" -- the form in which we are aware of entities and the form in which we remember them. For the Naive Realists a change in "appearance" must be a change in the object! Betsy: right Naive Realists say that universals exist independently of consciousness. Glenn: That's getting into concepts. What's different about how they view percepts? I thought naive realism was just a theory of perception, not of concept formation. Koz_: Be careful...when the sun is setting and objects appear redder...there *has* been a metaphysical change in the object. Jim, that is correct, as I understand it as well.. GlennM: I would call that view intrinsicism, not naive realism. Glenn: *nod* Aristotle for example saying that the *treeness* was resided in trees themselves. -was Naive realism is the basis of intrinsicism. Enough of the conceptual theory stuff already they think the brain is a passive lump of wax, and reality is a hot signet ring which impresses itself in your mind when you open your eyes. cognition isn't needed for understanding. it is impressed automatically upon the mind. through the senses. TomM, that's why I type must. So what they're doing is to claim that our senses are accurate, regardless of reality, i.e., physical laws that may cause a stick to appear bent underwater. GlennM: But not all intrinsicists are naive realists. Plato for example didn't trust the senses to tell us about reality, but trusted a form of intuition. Koz_: if we perceive a change, there *is* a change. TomM, Yes. koz_: At least there is a change in the relationship between the object and our senses. Subetai, yes.. Meaning that our senses are again magical, and do not conform to reality, but are "above" it. okie Subetai, correct, that they have no identity of their own But the question is: Is it a change in the object, the perceiver, or both? I think I can contrast this to the Objectivist theory quickly here Dr. Binswanger's Consciousness As Identification goes into this in detail. The naive realist rules out changes in the perceiver that are not the result in changes in the object. Perception does not provide the answer to this question on its own. Only conception can determine what entities have changed. the Naive Realists want consciousness to reproduce, to copy the external object Objectivism doesn't make the assumption that consciousness copies anything Clay: knowing is *not* copying. O'ism simply says, we're getting the information and it is what it is, and consciousness has what effect on it that is has... and we go from there Tom, I know that, why did you say that?L Clay: Just emphasising ;) ok :) Please continue. I just removed the key since it's 11. What other theories were you going to cover, Clay? ok, were there any questions.. ? I think we could do subjectivism here real quick and call it a night ok I'm going out. Goodnight :) ok to understand subjectivism on perception it's important to understand Naive Realism The subjectivists accept the a priori assumption made by the Naive Realists that consciousness should copy reality if it is to be valid. Clay: Subjectivism says our minds *create* perceived objects. They then proceed to show numerous examples of how consciousness doesn't copy reality and they conclude what Tom just said As I understand the two basic schools of subjectivism are the Cartesian and Kantian schools What's the difference? The Cartesian Representationalists try to uphold an external reality by trying to infer it from internal objects created by consciousness the Kantians smash the cartesians and prove it can't be done well... maybe I'm confused on this But I'm fairly certain the Kantians don't believe in the external world at all Clay: sounds good to me. They think the perceptions of the external world are mere deceptions Both are primacy of consciousness types. Clay: DesCartes thought perception was incourageable (incorrectible). incorrigible How did Descarte view changes in appearance? That would be crucial. yes, they are. The Kantians are the most significant of the two for our purposes Good night, folks. I'm not sure, Koz Anyone have any more questions? Okay, I think we're done with the first instalment. Thanks, Clay. The Kantians, as I said before, make a priori assumptions on what consciousness should be The main thing about the subjectivists is that they say we cannot know reality *because* of the mind's identity. Since our minds process sensations, the results are invalid. ok.. Go ahead and continue if you want to. Or feel free to start a new discussion. Glenn, right, and they reach this conclusion b/c of their false assumption Descartes did have "clear and distinct ideas," Kant's criterion was different. they take the Naive Realists at their word, and proceed to smash them Until Rand... :) Unfortunately, I only heard it once and didn't think to memorize. and she showed that making a priori assumptions on consciousness was wrong You have to go w/ what is.. not w/ what you want it to be Both schools began with concepts (disconnected from reality) to try justify the validity of conceptualization as means of knowledge. Right.. The Kantians feed off of the Naive Realists, that was the point I was trying to make They set up the straw man that the Naive Realists are the *true* upholders of the primacy of existence Clay: The Kantians feed off of all philosophic mistakes. ClayMH: what is a Naive Realist as opposed to a sophisticated Realist? Is there such a thing? Naive Realism is called that because it is considered to be a naive, almost childlike way of viewing perception When you get to the level of concepts, you can drop the Naive part Realist theories of concepts aren't quite so naive I'd like to try to do a discussion on Locke's theory of concepts some night but I'm afraid I'd get slaughtered by you folks Locke was very close to getting it right. and whoever suggested "Consciousness As Identification by Binswanger" earlier... it's a good series Ghaki: where did Locke fall short? I guess you could say he was as right as you could get and still be wrong Clay: yep Locke said to get rid of all the accidental characteristics and what was left was the concept He made the error the percepts=concepts Does anyone have OPAR handy? and he didn't quite get how measurement ommission works Not me. Mine's at work. I think Locke used similarity exclusively as his basis for concepts. Got OPAR here. I have a question Glenn: that was probably his biggest mistake. if he had realized the crucial importance of differentiation he could have made a major breakthrough. Take the concept "relative" (as in kin) . Where does measurement ommision come in for that concept I would say that most modern realists (non-O'ist) are those consider agreement among certified people to be the basis on which to validate a perception. Troy: You measuer that they are part of the family. ;) Troy: In *how* they're related, e.g., sister, father, etc. TomM: that is not a quantity, mor does it fall on a linear ordering, so how is it a measurement They end up with technology as their sole criterion for any concept. They're related = CCD. Nature of relationship = omitted measurement. Troy: The units are that they all issued from the same lineage. troy: The measuerment of how long the lineage is is omitted. Not "how long the lineage is", but "type of relationship" is the omitted measurement. troy: son vs grandson vs great-gradson, etc. Subetai: That would work as well. be right back... TomM: counting of the removals as in cousins, or generations as in grandparents? TomM: ok, that sounds right Should I take lack of disagreement as a sign of agreement? B) What was the question, Koz? How about the concept "Baseball Player", an open ended class of people. The CCD is that they play baseball. Where is the measurement? Or just lack of interest in modern realists? I think we have lags. Troy: you omit the measurement of whether they're shortstop, pitcher, etc. Tym: that is not a measurement, but an enumeration of roles IRC log ended Fri May 24 23:23