IRC log started Fri Jun 6 22:03 Welcome to #GeekSpeak. Before we begin, I'd like to remind you that all channel logs are the copyright of the channel owners: Pankaj Saxena and Tom Wright. Logs may not be redistributed in any form without the prior consent of the channel owners. Tonight's discussion is on "More Concepts out of a Hat", and will be moderated by Tym Parsons. As usual, the discussion will be conducted in keyword-protected mode. If you see someone off-channel whom you think would like to join the discussion and would not be disruptive, please message me or Wright. OK, quickee review of the game for those who haven't played... Concepts in a Hat is attributed to Ayn Rand. It's a game whereby one tries to connect seemingly disparate concepts.. ..since every fact of reality is connected with every other fact of reality, the same thing applies to philosophical concepts. What we will try to do is see what the paired concepts I pull out of my fez have in common Bonus points will be given for identifying which concept is more fundamental Questions so far? profit, "human needs" (This is an old socialist false dichotomy) Profit is value produced in excess of the values used to create it. Humans need values to live. Humans nedd profits. Profit means to create what people need, at a cost lower than the value created. Only those who create are entitled to things which fill their needs. Wait -- are we supposed to relate the actual meanings or ..? "Human needs" in quotes means use the common meaning? Sube: sure Sube: that's just the phrase socialists use Betsy: righto It's a fraudulent alternative. profit is the measure of relative market value created when someone transforms raw materials into a saleable good. The degree of this profit, is the degree to which some human need has been satisfied. Stephen: yep OK...next one. "soft money", independence What's soft money? ooh Tym: Define "soft money" paper money, without backing Phil: printing cash to lower the interest rates Phil: re: campaign finance "reform" Tym: Oh, ok Like, unlimited donations to political parties? Phil: right It is hard to be independent in an environment awash with soft money, because then the market price of your goods becomes rather dependent on government whim Soft money is used as an alterantive to independece. Substituting the choice of the donor of s.m. for the choices you should make guided by your reason. Soft money implies that individuals are free to support any political party to any extent they want Stephen, Phil: closer They can exercise their independent judgement rather than being constrained by arbitrary regs commodity money is an objectively valuable good, and must be acquired by effort and is a value when earned -- it is the result of and means of independence -- fiat money is the antithesis -- it is arbitrary and confiscatory and capricious. Brad: Soft money isn't being used as fiat money in this context Brad: this isn't about currency. This is about a bill before Congress to stymie free speech Phil: I think I get that term wrong. Brad: I think you meant soft *currency*. Tym: Um, I think we're about tapped out for the nonce :) No -- fiat money is money backed by nothing, isn't it? I recall Mises using the term 'money substitutes' or 'fiduciary media of exchange' to refer to notes, and such What is soft money? OK...my answer is: soft money in reality is simply the right to free speech... It's money that can be donated by individuals to campaign funds, I think in any amount. ...rights give the ability to practise the virtue of independence Tym: I don't think I can agree with that Phil: the McCain bill proposes to ban campaigning for a candidate even if it's not by the candidates organisation Campaigning as in even volunteering, etc.? It's a measure that moves us closer to single-party rule. Jason: yep! It's flat-out censorship We had a measure here in Canada to prohibit 3rd party campaigning or advocacy -- it was thankfully quashed. What's campaigning implied to be? Any form of active support of any type, monetary or otherwise? It prevents people like Steve Forbes from *ever* having a chance a expressing his views. GlennM: I believe it is contributions made to the party of the candidate instead of the candidate directly. Soft money is unlimited while direct contributions are limited by law. But in a you should be able to give however much you wish. a = at OK, we need to move on to the next pair... mixed economy, hedonism cjs: right Hmm both are based on the premise that you can evade reality and long term consequences, and achieve ends without means Whim worship and pragmatism. Tym: expediency & short term perspective, both valdiated by feelings instead of logical thought So given the _current_ #'s of Demos and Repubs, limiting to individual donations would in fact make it almost impossible to get a 3d party candidate rolling with larger private donations Both are examples of trying to satisfy desires for the irrational by ignoring the consequences. All good answers.. Phil: Of course. The Toohey principle. Is there any more fundamental commonality? Gauge the purpose of any measure strictly by its necessary consequences. subjectivism Glenn: yes! Tym: Both are evasion of proper human needs I would say pragmatism is pretty deep into fundamental territory. standard gets confused with purpose OK, next pair.. existentialism, duty Death-worship. primacy of consciousness Existentialism is a subjectivist rebellion against arbitrary traditional ethics based on duty. Jason: bingo! Tym: both are cases of strict adherence to whim, in this case consistently to just *one* whim and dedicating one's self to that single whim. Legendre, Betsy: very good OK, next: Idealism, statism Plato As in Platonic idealism? Tym: There is more that one "right answer" when you play this game because things are connected to each other in many ways in reality. Betsy: yup! Kant's ethics. Dr. Peikoff says the really challenging way to do this is make rhyming couplets ;) Phil: heh Tym: the perfect state as the social ideal Phil: That's fun if you're facuile with words and have a large vocabulary. Phil: metaphysical idealism eg Hegel, Plato -u Betsy: Yes.. Legendre: what is Idealism tho? Statism purports to embody the "essence of good" in the State, devoid of an objective relationship to Man and Reality That your senses or your mind aren't good enough to identify what's good or bad in reality. Intrinsicism would work too. Tym: the idea that perfection is in another realm. The idea is to try to get this realm to conform, by means of brute force, since this realm is mere matter Sube: it's more than that. It's the idea that ideas are the only "true" reality. (We're having some problems with the net. I got some emails in the last few minutes from people who can't connect - if you ping out, please try logging back on) Hint: is there a concrete referent to the state or society in reality? howdy whoops...or should i say good evening Tym: Not really, except insofar as one looks at individual men Sounds a bit like legal positivism. Tym: The abstraction "man" is a single unit in the other world, which means collectivism, which means the individual is unimportant here in this world. Phil: right. "Society" is just shorthand for X number of individuals Legendre: getting closer Tym: In the other realm, the state and "man" are one How would a belief in Idealism condition one's moral views in this regard? Tym: the state in this realm is man exerting control over himself "Man" being the other-world abstraction Hint: what was the Good for Hegel? If there is only one ideal Man, then it's a "proper" function of this state to coerce the flawed reflections of individual men to that noble goal? Tym: they certainly both share some aspects of rationalism... Phil: no, I don't think that follows A focus on abstracts like the "state" being more than just a collection of concrete individuals. Focus on the idea rather than the concrete. Sube: so iow, the "good of society" has a literal referent for an Idealist? (in this case at least) That's what I was getting at, Tym. To an idealist, there are only "really" ideas, a single thing. Mere individuals with their mere individual values are then nothing Tym: Yeah. Society is something more than just a collection of individuals. They judge the good of society independently of the concretes of which it consists, i.e., individuals. Sube: right! They give society intrinsic value Idealism can enable statism because it shifts focus toward a supposed "good of society" rather than real, concrete men. OK, next. Romantic art, capitalism they give a referent to 'their ' concept of society , one that does not exist (chestnut) both concerned with values. A capitalistic society, with its respects for individuality, makes possible a society where individuals are free to pursue romantic art Two things which reached their height in the afterglow of the Age of Reason. Both require reason. Both are fundamentally concerned with the individual individualism Both grew out of the principal that man has the power to choose Both involve normative values in a deep way Romantic art expresses the best within man who can express the best within themselves through Capitalism OK, what if I shift the emphasis to just "Art and Capitalism". What then? Normative concepts I should say It's a weaker connection, given the broader range of art incl. naturalism Phil: what is the function of art? To show a concretized instance of an ideal And what is the function of capitalism In order to provide mental/emotional fuel for people To permit people to freely pursue values Both art and Capitalism concretize abstract values. Aha, yeah, that sounds good how does capitlism concretize abstract values? And they do so via individuals Betsy: right. It's like when AR said that the fact that AS was published meant that there were heroes in the world, just as in her book Art give metaphysical values physical form and capitalism creates and distributes economic values. Capitalism is about individual pursuit of profit, art is about individual creation and appreciation of values the products of capitalism *embody* or are the result of abstract values, but they don't concretize them. Art idealises efficacy; capitalism embodies it in action That's good Yeah. OK, next. Teleology, Materialism Yikes This might be a toughie art shows what can be achieved; capitalism acheives it. Tym: Materialism is that everything is mechanical, and can't be teleological as there are no ends to be served, just pure mechanicalism Denial of volition. Joe: Embody .. make concrete and physically real. What's the difference? Legendre, Odegard: close. Materialism is a repudiation of consciousness as such... not just volition Define "teleology" please. tym , materialism states that we are not aware ? Teleology is measuring values by their relationship to man, right? Goal-striving behavior I thought teleology was general for all life They are almost "opposites". Phil: it is teleology is goal oriented action , no ? Glenn: yup. If one is valid, the other can't be Materialism implies that life is impossible, then Materialism would deny teleology since there are no conscious goals if there is no consciousness. Betsy: exactly but doen't teleology also include non-conscious action (like that of plants)? In other words, Freud was a Materialist. "The study of ends or final causes, specially as related to evidence of design or purpose in nature" That's from OED. joe: all living things have some form of consciousness Jason: yup tym: ok, yes. Hokay. I have a final Bonus pairing. tym in what way are plants conscious? I guess we're using a different meaning here. tym: consciousness or awareness? Tym: Actually they have some form of input and way to respond to the outside world, but "consciousness id usually limited to the awareness of animals. joe: same thing Betsy: LP uses "consciousness" in the sense of a contact with reality That's too vague rocks are conscious ? "sense of Contact" so in this context a plant is concious of its validity and struggles to retain life? Tad: see IOE, the levels of consciousness: sensation, perception, conceptual. It has to be along the lines of, a persistent internal state that systematically reflects some external stimulus Tad: only pet rocks Betsy: consider that the first stage of consciousness is sensation. Plants have those, right? Tym do palnts have a nervous system ? or plants even tkTad: yes No Sube: they have evoked potentials albeit minute but plants respond to external stimulii (turn to light source) They have no specialized tissue to transmit information. That's what a nervous system is. Tym: plants have tropisms. They don't need senses like animals do because they can't locomote. The only respond to conditions where they are: sunlight, gravity, water, etc. Evoked potentials occur at the level of single cells. All cells are electrically active if they're alive. joe they do not turn to light source, as much as their internal mechanics are 'set up' to Thay have a rudimentary capability for responding to some stimulus. Subetai: and potentials are evoked in plants in response to external stimuli. Tym: sure, but that's not a nervous system. Anyway...let's get on to the final question. okay Stephen define respond in the context of being "aware" of the stimuli tkTad, joe: maybe we can pick this up later Tad: No Let's move on. We can come back to plants in a while. OK. This is a silly one. I was on #philosophy one time, and this guy disputed the idea that every fact is connected with every other fact. So he asked, "what does the fact that I have new whitewall tires on my car have to do with the fact that the sun rises every morning?" Aside from the obvious answer, how can we elicit _philososophical_ conclusions from this pair? There's an _obvious_ answer? ;) If the sun didn't rise every morning, there would be no whitewall tires. :) I.e. what could be the philosophical significance of "new whitewall tires"? Facts are connected. The sun rising helps the rubber trees to grow and makes the existence of (rubber) tires possible. The tyres are petroleum products, the sun feeds plants etc. Yeah, that was my thought Sube. No sun, no life, no Man, no nothin Spectrum of colors in sunlight the sun stimulates Man to produce... ie Whitewall tires Yeah, that too. If we were sensitive to infrared, they'd hardly be white. Tym: I don't understand what you mean by philosophic conclusions vs. some other kind in this context All: those are the obvious answers. But what philosophical ideas might these embody? Tym: both things are what the are and act according to their natures Sounds like a concrete-bound mentality versus a conceptual thinker. It's philosophical only in the sense that it deals with metaphysical facts of reality which ARE related to one another. Phil: "Watergate" represents a philosophical idea(s); "OJ" another I don't get you, I'm afraid Without motive stimulation there is no production (life) a is a , the law of identity applies to both his possessions and the sun tkTad: yes! The fact that that man CAN count on the sun rising tomorrow, gave him the ability and reason to work... which earned him the new tires. Amy: yes! :) And if he works smarter and harder he can afford the spiffy white-wall kind "Brand new whitewalls" = technology "Sun rising in the morning" is a conclusion of "pure science" the cause and effect scenarios are more akin to scientific realm ,no ? what produces rubber and the like , no ? Well, that's stretching ... it's pretty common sense observable But both applied and pure science are inductive tkTad: right More like "here's something that a *fact* therefore can be used and relied on" Sube: right Thanks for moderating, Tym :) Anyone want to debate "consciousness"? Take another.:*) sure re consciousness , how could plants be considered such / I think you need to define exactly what "awareness" is, and how you can tell if something is aware. Define your concepts and the issue is easy to decide. Jinx! :) I think some element of processing information is crucial to "awareness" - it's not just reacting to the environment. Sube: cognitive self-regulation Hmm explain that please, tym cognitive implies introspection , no? Tym: I only think that is true of _volitional_ consciousness. Sube: it's a contact with reality that serves the organism in maintaining itself as such Betsy: ack. Cognition. Yes, yr right tk: My understanding is that Conciousness is the faculty which perceives that which exists. One could perceive existence through sensations only without forming perceptions or concepts. That would be how a plant could be concious at the lowest level. Tym: Sure. I'm thinking of it in terms of "processing" - to distinguish it from reaction. For instance, a rock reacts to being pushed. "Consciousness is the faculty of awareness--the faculty of perceiving that which exists. That BTW is AR's definition Not a passive state but an _active_ one Sube: odd usage there "react" Do plants have an active state of awareness? Phil: "perceiving" is used generally, here, including the sensory level? Where are the sensory organs of plants? Tym: well, "react" means to respond in some way to a stimulus. BlueGreen: Consciousness requires some form of integration, and also some manner of initiating action. Sube: rocks are passive and inert In fundamentals, what are the essential differences between plants and animals? Sentience. Phil consciousness ? plants are passive in their awareness. Plants are not aware. sure they're inert re Lisa Plants have no brains, even rudimentary ones plants cannot direct the focus of their awareness, whereas animals can. All animals do, even houseflies, albeit really, really rudimentary I think it's an essential distinction Why then did plants develop defensive mechanisms? Phil: Locomotion is a primary difference. Plants don't have to move from place to place to find food, so they don't need to be as aware of their surroundings which don't change very much. Betsy: Yes plants are not "aware' the stuctures within a plant react to physical and chemical stimuli , the plant does not function as an integrated whole on an 'awareness' level And to relate that to what Icea mentioned, plants have sophisticated in-place chemical defense systems as I understand it, because they can't "run" there is a certain categorical aspect of consciousness, and that is that via a process which somehow embodies the essence of the reality outside the organism, mirrors and recreates it internally. wouldnt that indicate a type of self-awareness then? With the organism itself part of the process, codified in a commensurable way. Brad: you can get into trouble characterising it that way ;) In certain individuals, the functions of the organs may be switched Brad: Integration would require the faculty of reason. To say that conciousness requires some form of integration woul imply animals are not concious...would it not? Brad: It doesn't mirror it. That would be the representational theory of consciousness. It _responds_ to it. What's the saying? The little head thinking for the big head ... they cant run but they still put energy into protection of their "lives" That mapping process is critical -- it is more than just the passive kind of transductino which occurs in plants, and the direct sensory or physical chains in single cell organisms. Gotta go now. Later, Betsy See y'all. Oh, yeah -- dispute and run. :) Plants don't have "self-awareness" - parts of them can respond to external stimuli in different ways. But for the organism to be aware of itself as a whole, there needs to be some way to collect external information and make it available to all parts. It's a drive-by disputing. When I say mirror, I don't mean metaphorically, I mean literally. Just how shiny IS your consciousness? ;) Is it Hyperbol-ic? ;) Brad reversed image ? :) On the perceptual side, a process of reduction takes place, basically along the lines of Rand's theory of measurement omission. That's still an active neurological process Which plants don't have What occurs in mind, is a process and maintenance of mental entity-states, whose attributes embody the essence of existence. Organisms that only have sensations can't have any reduction going on. That some animals have percepts (or so we assume) doesn't mean that they use any process of reduction. When a ball is flying across my vision field, there *is* a ball-mentaloid flying in my brain. The reality ball directly causes the mentaloid ball. Subetai do plants then even have sensations? Tad: I don't think so. what is the difference between a sensation and a percept(ion)? how can an organism react to stimuli with out rudementary sensation? mencken: perception *is* a reduction - sensations are automatically combined so you are aware of one thing instead of several. There has to at minimum be some kind of integration of one's own body qua existent, before the possibility of sensation even arises. By the way, how come SRB doesn't stock Dr Reisman's book on capitalism? i think plants are groups of like structures , and the individual structures react to physical and chemical states Just *what* is supposed to be sentient? Subetai: But I spoke of >active< reduction. That automatic process is all animals have. Leg: Reismans are persona non grata with the other well known O'ists ic *Physical* organisms don't experience sensations. The experience of sensation is a phenemenon of consciousness. mencken: Perception is always automatic. "To sense there must be something doing the sensing" Brad: "non physical" organisms do? ;) Brad, what's this about a ball in your head? Tym: No, I mean you can't just say that my room feels my touch when I turn on the light. The way I see it, when you say that an organism has "self awareness" to any degree, you should be able to see the organism as a whole respond to some external stimulus. Perception or percepts? We may be speaking at cross purposes. a sensor and even a means of integrating sensory data is necessary, but NOT -- most emphatically NOT sufficient for sensation, qua mental phenomenon. 1 billion monkeys wiring some neurons together will not produce a consciousness, I promise. :) I thought that was the new gov't program for producing consciousness tho? It has IDENTITY. It is a very particular thing. In particular, apart from its role of integrating data from reality, at its core must be an integration of the entity itself, in congruent terms of other reality. AND that semi-mysterious factor of what I call volition, and get blasted for, but will staunchly defend that choice. In other words, an awareness of itself? Plants do seem to have some slow response to chemical signals and bug attacks, etc. Internal chemical states are changing, leaves can furl, etc. I'm not sure what to call that though Rocks don't decide to get up and walk across the room. My dog fido does, and *nothing* in external reality determines it. I'm afraid I'm lost. Legendre: you could purchase the book directly from the publisher: Jameson Books, P.O.Box 738, Ottawa, IL 61350. Retail price: $95. 1-800-426-1357. (info. in AOB News May/June). Richard Salsman will probably publish a pamphletreview the book at the Lyceum Conference in August. Phil: See my comments regarding consciousness being a *particular* kind of process. Vastly many more biological processes exist than consciousness. me too , on what criteria does a dog 'decide' / Bending towards sunlight is no more consciousness than my stomach's digesting food. I am too, Brad said he had a ball in his head and I must have missed the question which gave that relevance. Brad: But it is teleological action Here's a stumper -- what's the relationship between teleological action and consciousness? Subetai: Self-awareness, exactly -- THE touchstone and defining characteristic of consciousness. Even the most primitive insect is as self-aware as we are, in the categorical sense. Eh, really? I dunno about that In that case, plants have no consciousness, because they don't possess the necessary equipment for self awarenesss. bugs are 'self-aware '? Phil: Conscious beings have codified the fundamentals of identity and causality applied to entities, including themselves. insects can ditinquish between themselves and the rest of reality , they have these concepts ? Tad: Not concepts, of course. Volition is a continuous process of 'next state' generation. Imagination allows the simulation of reality. Plausible end states from present can be generated. Well, don't mix conceptual/volitional consciousness with all consciousness either An end state can then be contemplated -- animals do this, for instance. Brad how could a nonvolitonal being contemplate , anything ? Tad: I take "self-awareness" to mean that the organism shows some signs that it's capable of reacting as a whole to external stimuli. That implies being able to differentiate between itself and the outside. A housefly is attracted to an open jar of honey, which is a form of teleological action, but is that volitional consciousness? If the consequence is deemed worthy, then a sort of reverse causality calculator is invoked. Sub me too, it also implies a *conceptual* consciousness this permits the calculation of actions, given desired end states. It is codified in a similar way to concepts, via measurement omissions. Hello hello Tom M Tad: It doesn't. Perceptual awareness also consists of collecting sensations and putting them together into one entity with a unique identity. That process is non-conceptual. Is the discussion still on? At its lowest scale, it is the movements of particular members, in coordinated pursuit of immediate goals. At a higher level, it is abstractions of abstractions, and you get methods, such as the strategies employed by animals for stalking and hunting. Self awareness is simply the same thing directed towards oneself, or itself. Is a cat self conscious? Yeah. self awareness implies the concept of self Phil: re Fly. Teleological, yes, within the very narrow range of what a fly could consider. Its powers of imagination would be extremely limited. Tad: In this sense, all it implies is being able to distinguish between oneself and everything else. And for animals, their value hierarchy is not open to question -- they experience it as a primary, as many humans do. :) Subetai: i saw somethng on the use of mirrors to examine how carious animals were self-aware. I think only the chimp met the criteria of the experimentors (it had to do with how they responded to their reflection) But do animals themselves experience themselves just a primary rather than self-reflecting? So in essence, they are guided by emotion and chance. They are most primarily influenced by their immediate surroundings. Brad: animals don't have emotions. Joe: I think that goes beyond just self-awareness - it also requires recognition of the image in the mirror as being themselves. But they also have the ability of projection, to some degree. For example, my dog at home used to get very excited and distracted towards the time my father would come homw. Sube: Do they? Phil: do they what? Phil: well, hep cats certainly are self conscious ;-) Obviously, she was imagining him, remembering how happy she felt on receiving him before, and thus other possibly pursuits held little sway. Sube: Do they recognize the mirror image as themselves? I've seen cats paw at their own mirror image are self-aware and physical self-recognition the same? even human babies must learn to distinguish between their reflection and another child Sub so a cougar is thinking that he is not part of the field, he is aware the he exists and the field exists and can contemplate future actions or does it respond to the stimuli? In the mirror experiment, higher level monkeys were able to find spots on themselves via the mirror, but I don't think that counts as self-awareness. Phil: I don't know. I'm just saying that the mirror test isn't necessarily a test of self-awarenesss. I'm not sure what it means in the human contxt, which is all we have ... Anthropomophising is dangerous here Tad: re non-volitional -- are you saying that animals don't initiate actions of consciousness? If so, I disagree, on all available evidence. Tad: Just the first part - i.e., he can differentiate between himself and the field, or anything else. That doesn't mean he's "thinking" or "contemplating" anything. Brad: animals don't have volition. I think animals have volition but they have no _concepts_ That's why I'd like to keep it simple. All these terms have meanings when applied to humans that obviously don't hold when talking about animals. Phil: What do you mean 'is a cat self conscious'? Is it aware of itself qua existent, as it is aware of other entities in reality, AND does it fundamentally distinguish awareness of itself from that of all other entities? Of course. Sub i think self awareness implies the ability or faculty capable of integrating the distinction Phil: They don't have volition. How do you come to the conclusion that they do? Because they are no deterministic no=not Tad: It requires a capability of holding that distinction, yes. Why would that be a conceptual faculty? animals rely on instinct. that precludes volition phil. sure they are deterministic. Sub how would the distinction be held otherwise ? There are differences in consciousness in the range of non-conceptual Tom: Flies and spiders have very limited domains of concern. Nevertheless, they are conscious, aware, and guide their actions. Tad: Perceptually, perhaps. Tom: Animals certainly do have emotions. joe: I don't think the evidence supports that Brad: I didn't say they were not aware of existence, but they are not aware of *themselves*. Sub ho do they 'hold' one percept from the next instance of the same percept ? decision making does not equal voliton. Whether Rover follows you or someone else is deterministic? I doubtit Tad: There's only one instance of that particular percept - they only have one body, one consciousness of it. I think it is improper to say animals "make decisions." Phil: But you must remember that a mirror is a highly abstract thing, right? Remember, animals perceive themselves, but the don't *see* themselves. phil: if animals had volitoin then we wuld have to morally judge them (bad doggie :-) tom: If animals are not self-aware, then that term is meaningless. joe: HUman infants 1 year old have volition. We don't morally judge them. phil: your bringing up a special case with infants. also, infants don't fully have voliton developed. You're missing the essential point Brad: You mean that a dog knows when *it* is hurt, or something like that? I wouldn't call that self-awareness. Phil ' Anthropomophising is dangerous here' IN fact, all theorizing on consciousness must be based on careful observation -- all those aspects in which human behavior has counterparts in animals should be taken to derive from a common cause, absent any evidence. It would be arbitrary to consider otherwise. I can't type the way I'd like, computer is doing some background stuff now Brad: How one relates those "counterparts" must certainly be done carefully One has to differentiate reacting to stimuli from self-awareness, which i think is being missed here. Subetai'all these term...humans' The problem is that terms that have clear referents with humans have the same referent in animals. To arbitrarily call the human term categorical, is anti-rational, since it is definition by non-essentials. to be self aware means to be aware that the self is a *specific entity* of a specific kind, usually similar toone that it has observed out there. The key is conceptual vs. non-conceptual in human or not. But a fly and a mouse and a cat and a horse and a monkey all have differences in consciousness Brad: It's based on a recognition that humans are different from animals. A warning not to extrapolate from humans ad infinitum, without keeping in mind the nature of the relevant differences. animals react, humans decide to react or not Phil: That's true, but the fundamental difference of consciousness between humans and animals is specifically self-awareness. The problem with the term 'instinct' is that it is completely meaningless. It does not explain one iota of how animals initiate action in reality. It is literally a mystic term. In fact, humans and animals are highly similar. Is self-awareness the foundation of concept-formation? INteresting question Brad: animals, the higher ones anyhow, are capable of learning, but that does not mean they are self-aware. How would you define "self aware" Tom? Tom: i would say the fundamental def. between human and animal consciousnes is the cognitive, conceptual, volitional faculties in man. phil: Yes it is. One has to be aware of the functioning of one's own mind to be able to form concepts. joe: and that *requires* self-awreness. Does a 2 year old? Tom: There is no evidence to suggest that animals are not aware of themselves. That is nonsense. They have senses that permit them to integrate external objects, and evey evidence indicates their own self is perceived as well. Without self-awareness, guiding action is impossible. Phil: right about 2 yrs old, I think that's when it starts. Is first level concept acquisition from self-awareness? Brad: You are equivocating. Yes, animals are aware of the functioning of their bodies, to some extent, but that is not the same as self-awareness as it applies to humans. Animals make decisions. They weigh alternatives according to a standard, which is emotional. They project the various alternatives, such a lion's decision to eat you or run away, and choose one, presumably via a process similar to what we call 'whim'. phil: No, from awareness of external objects, but it must be guided by the self. Tom: self awareness is not the fundamental aspect. 'TomM> Brad: You mean that a dog knows when *it* is hurt, or something like that? I wouldn't call that self-awareness.' If "self awareness" means the ability to introspect and to guide abstraction formation and use, then only humans are self aware Brad: Animals don't have emotions. Emotions are the result of having a self-chosen standard. There is nothing else to call self-awareness but self-awareness. A is A. I think "self awareness" just means being aware of one's person or body as distinct from everything else. Being able to separate itself from the environment. This is interesting Sub with the use of the concept 'distinct' Phil: It is mysticism to posit that if every species of animal has some attribute, and man has it, that because man has an additional attribute, it therefore is automatically not related. Well, it's still equivocating. Yes, animals can tell when they are hurt, but they have no self to be aware of. Brad: no. the lion's decision making proces is a perceptual level one. in humans it is conceptual level. you therefore can't compare the actions of a lioon with the whim of a human. Brad: Not saying that Related is not synonymous with equivalent <-- important point Tad: You call it the "concept" distinct because that's how you understand it. It doesn't require any such concept. All it requires is a recognition of identity, which is percceptual. Shall we declare that human perception has no relation whatever to animal perception? That nothing about human conscisousness has any relation? That is patent nonsense. We evolved from animals, and have a evolved quite categorically, consciousness qua phenomenon is richly layered and complex, and many of the layers are parallel, for sure. Brad: Nonetheless, it doesn't mean animals have self-awareness or a self-consciousness. the physical atributes are perceptually apprehended , the understanding of them conceptial, they are held and 'used' by the mind via concepts Does the concept of 'self' arise fundamentally from "I want it" ? A deep tie to valuation and teleogy Self-consciousness is like a quantum leap, which the animals never made. Conceptual faculty gives the unique ability of *introspection*, but that is not the same at all as self-awareness. Tad: They're held and used non-conceptually as well, every time a dog goes through a door instead of trying to go through a wall. Brad: in fact, human consciousness below the conceptual cognitive level is probably identical to that of animals. so what? And introspection is what permits self-directed value creation, and abstract values in general. Brad: True, but animals are not capable of doing that. I don't think it's introspection, it's goal-directedness without self-awareness of the operations of its own mind Sub a dog goes thru a door because it can sense the difference in the air pressure , nt because they 'know' it is better The value mechanism of animals is strictly biological, and not conscious. That's preposterous, tk But in many ways, the conceptual faculty merely extends the range of preexisting faculties. It builds on them, to provide a fantastical new capability, but the base is the same between man and animals. Tad: Has nothing to do with air pressure. It's because dogs recognize entities and can distinguish between them. And associate actions with them. Tad: no, i think thee is some kind of perceptual level training or "learning" in animals. for exampe recognizing their owner. Brad: it is particularly the ability to control the functioning of the mind that man has and animals don't have. And you can't overly romanticize conceptual consciousness from a functional/structural point of view. Like, if I add some clever cache or buffer or something to a CPU, it may only be a small addition, but could lead to mammoth gains in processing and capability... k, gotcha , right Brad: The point I was making is this -- self awareness _as human beings use it_ is intimately connected with conceptuality and identity of human consciousness qua human consciousness including perhaps leading to a complete transformation of the entire software industry and the economy. But qua engineering entity, it is what it is. phil: I agree. animals can not do that. The cortex in man may well be the biological difference, but animals simply don't have that added complexity to their brains. I think animals _must_ have some form of "self consciousness" but it's not conceptual, obviously The brain as a biological mechanism controls aspects of the body. Man, and only man, can control aspects of consciousness. The point is, human consciousness and animal consciousness are related but not identical. The difference is something that has to be investigated and determined, not extrapolated from one or the other. Sube: Precisely ie man as rational animal Tad: dogs are every bit as aware of entities in reality as you are. Their perceptual experience is identical to yours. phil: If animals are aware of their consciousness, it is only in the sense we ar aware of our bodies -- i.e. strictly biologically, and not volitionally. I think self-awareness requires more than the mere biological sensing of what is going on inside. Sube: but i think it wod be safe to say that human consciousness is the same as animals' with other features in addtion (volition, concepts, self-awareness, emotions) Joe: I don't know. I don't think anything is safe to assume as a fact unless you know why it *has* to be. A good example of the equivalence, is if you have ever been to some technical or specialized place, filled with existents whose nature and purpose were foreign to you. That puts you on (more or less) the same level as the animal. Tom: I think positing first-level concept formation in some animals explains a lot of "behavior". What they can't do is abstract from the abstractions You experience and integrate the existents, qua physical objects, but don't experience their purpose. phil: Animals have memory, and can associate things according to similarities, but they don't retain it as a concept. It's strictly a memory. Because animals _can_ react to a class of entities similarly. A class, not just specific concretes one at a time Tom: How do you know that? Concepts are _retained_ via memory, it's not a contradiction anyway phil: I observe them. They can be trained strictly out of meorie associations, that's all. oops memorie association... You're saying you can't train an animal to deal with a _class_ of objects rather than specific concretes? Phil: Exactly. Animals are really quite locked to the perceptual. And I think that longer range behaviors have evolved as forms of compulsion -- a desire, for catharsis, to perform some action or erect some structure. Concepts are an added level of manipulation of the content of consciousness. animals have no volition, so they can't manipulate their own content of consciousness. It simply exists for them as perceived objects exist for us. You're not answering my question But I would argue that a bird building its nest is aware of what it is doing. Phil: no. first level concepts serve as *concretes* for the next level. if a being can do 1st level concepts, it can do any level. joe: In humans In other words, it is not just a flying automaton, picking up twigs and bringing them back to some spot, without any conscious intention. Brad: i never denied an animals is aware that it is doing something, but that does not give them *self* awareness, just awareness of doing something. I claim that animals can be identify classes of entities, anyone disagreeing? phil: I do. It has an image in imagination of the nest, just as we do of any perceptible goal, and it directs its actions, sub-methodologically to achieve the final end. A bird's reaction to a snake is a particular snake that it's mommy taught it via it's memory eh? They don't identify it qua class, just as being similar to the memory content of past experience. You're begging the question. Via what mechanism and how does it differ from a 1st level concept? Many animals seem to have the means of performing particular actions wired into them. It would seem that the evolutionary process can direct and select for these encoded skills. phil: it differes because they can not update it volitionally. all they can do is register experiences. Animal "teaching" occurs Very crudely Phil: again please, your syntax was mangled. But that's not the essential point Memory can be quite awesome in some animals, especially the larger ones, like elephants, but that does not mean they ahve 1st level concepts. The ability to identify an _abstract class_ of entities based on a _range_ of measurements is precisely the beginning of concept formation Ah, I get it now. Phil: concept formation is concept formation. it will be the same for all beings that are capable of it. again, it wuod be impossible tohave a concsiousness limeited to1st-level concept fromation, since concepts are retained as concretes, and their further integration is done in a process similar to that in which the first level was done. phil: Animals do not measure, so they can't do measurement ommission. joe: Rand noted that most _humans_ do not proceed substantially beyond the lowest levels of concepts I need to go for a minute to complete an update. back shortly. Yes, but very crudely. They can form association, both of attribute and causality. But they can't address *why's*, so that makes their knowledge as good as chance. When you look at a blue-like object you aren't "measuring" it consciously either when you associate it with blue The Pentium-II is the same as the PPro. It's Klamath - PPro + MMX. oops Phil is right. Animals can classify this way. They can then associate attributes with the class, not the instanced. phil: yes you are. you are measuing the attribute of color with regard toa range of colors. Measuring how? via a perceptual association. It sure as hell ain't 5020-6000 angstroms, in your mind ;) tom: Measurement omission is AUTOMATIC in man. And percepts are based on the same principle, only the entire process is automatice, whereas in concept formation, the decision to form a concept and much of its formation is voluntary. phil were did the concept of angstroms come from , if not by measuring the attributes with in a specific rangs to begi with In fact, if you project backwards from Rand's theory of concepts, you see that it can just as readily be applied both to percepts and something I call a norcept, which is the action equivalent. tk: That's high level concepts. But the concept 'blue' is the same regardless and so are the various shades of blue I use blue because it's a first level concept So it would seem that evolutionarily, concepts arose from a preexisint faculty. Probably some mutation. Once selected for, it would be awesomely selected for, and Dennet shows how such a dev. could be powerfully amplified through a process called directed evolution. Even bumblebees are attracted to certain shades of flowers. _Within a range_. It _is_ a form of measurement omission in its tiny little consciousness, even if automatic Phil the bee is 'programmed' to react to the colors of flowers , they can not decide to focus on the color or not it perceives it and reacts measurement omission sure is NOT automatic. it is volitional and as such is at the core of concept-formation and conceptual consciousness. tk: True. But it does do what I said I would think the obvious example to bear this out would be finding an animal that dodges poisonous plants(from a class) after eating them. Clay what if you mimicked the scenmt attributes of the poisonous clas, is the class the plants or the scent / tad, what if you did? sorry fingers felling asleep joe: Really, your _perception_ of two slightly different shades of blue as perceptually quite similar was chosen by you? The identification consciously, is, but not the perception. How the "mapping" of a range of perceived attributes occurs in a consciousness may be automatic (animals) or not (humans) but that fundamental characteristic is happening in all animals, i.e. differentiation and similarities Tad, essentially what Brad said earlier... phil: Perhaps, but they can not do *integration*, which is required for concept formation. Call it an analogy then -- an analogy between 1st level concepts and what animals demonstrably can do, which is identify classes of entities and act accordingly (e.g. bird afraid of a snake regardless of type) and a concept of self is required for being self aware phil: bad analogy. If they can't integrate, then they can't do concept formation, even on the 1st level. They don't identify a class. What they seem to be able to do is identify according to similarity, which is not the same thing. On the lower levels of awareness, a complex neurological process is required to enable man to experience a sensation and to integrate sensations into percepts; that process is automatic and non-volitional: man is aware of its results, but not of the process itself. That is, they don't consider it a *class*, merely similar to the memory content of earlier experience. and it is automatic, they do not decide to remeber and compare to memory Memory content is certainly involved in concept formation, but the difference between man and animals is that man can *choose* to connect one meory to another, while animals can not. Tad: Actually, that is the fallacious theory of animal-automatons. If animals were automatons, then there would be no need for consciousness. It either is or it isn't. It isn't both. tk: Exactly! And _how_? Via what mechanism? Via measurement omission (automatically being done.) phil: No, not measurement omission. Just association by similarities. To identify a "match" in terms of _range_ IS measurement omission, in actual fact How do you associate by similarities? Sounds like some kind of automatic measurement omission to me. That's exactly what it is Brad: in animals, consciousness is simply a better level of awareness of existence as compared to the one celled animals, but it is not self-directed. Not just similarities. _All_ consciousness is a _process_ of integration and differentiation. Brad am not saying animals are 8conscious8 , just that they are not self conscious, the latter requiring conceptual consciousness phil: Nope, only for man. arg typos galore Tom: It most certainly *is* self-directed. Have you ever *observed* animals, Tom? You seem to be basing your conclusion on deductive processes, not inductive ones. Sube: Doesn't the retina of animals do preliminary processing that finds edges (differences) and blobs? Retina + visual cortex It could be a form of automatic measurement omission, in a sense, but that still does not make it a concept. Animal brains, like ours, are prewired in many functions. to retain memory would require some type of recall mechanism and storage mechanism. But that is not concepts. Phil: Yeah. And the same process is continued and refined in a bunch of nuclei along the way before it gets to the cortex. When I observe animals acting, and humans acting, I observe a common attribute, different from that of, say, rocks falling or water running: intentionality. retinas react ot stimuli of light , some processing by some kind of consciousness interperts the data Brad: No, animals don't have intentionality, certainly not as it applies to humans, because they don't have volition. What they do have is goal directedness. I'm with Brad on this one. Human consciousness didn't arise from a bolt from Yahweh despite what Catholic think. We evolved from lower animals. Differentiation and similarity identification is _fundamental_ to _all_ consciousness phil: Be that as it may, and I can agree, but that still does not make it a *concept*. Conceptualization requires voilition, not just memory association. i agree, but only humans are , or can be , aware of the existence of the process I said "similar to" or "like a", which it is Phil: In fact, information is already highly sliced'n'diced by the time it reaches the brain, and then it extends into about five or seven different regions, if I recall, each one receiving a different kind of set of differentiated sensory data. It crosses over and merges first, before projecting into opposite lobes of the brain. Brad: but that is automatic, there is no self-directing of consciousness going on in animals. that we evolved from them doesn't mean the nature of our consciousness is in them, but that theirs is in us, which is is. One should not make a distinction without a difference. The ability of consciousness to act based on a _class_ of entities based on a _range_ of cohesive measurements (slithering snake with different characteristics) is ... what? It certain happens _somehow_ Tom: I wouldn't know how to differentiate the concepts 'goal directedness' and 'intentionality'. Intentionality would mean a conscious choice to pursue a consciously selected goal goal directedness simply means the animals mechanisms are geared towards survival. Intentional means you direct your consciousness to do a certain task volitionally. Brad a plants actons are 'goal directed' from a human perspective and understanding, but to the plant there is no awareness of the process tk: right, and awareness of the process is what intention means.