IRC log started Fri Sep 6 21:57 Welcome to #GeekSpeak. Before we begin, I'd like to remind you that logs of all discussions on this channel are the copyright of the channel owners: Tom Wright and myself. You may log the discussions for your personal use, but redistribution or publishing of these logs in any form without the written consent of the owners is forbidden. Tonight's discussion is on "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy" and is based on the article by Leonard Peikoff in ITOE, which was first published in "The Objectivist" (May-September, 1967). We'll talk about what the dichotomy *is*, and what it means, metaphysically and epistemologically. Then we'll discuss what's wrong with it. I'll start off with the question: what's the difference between analytic and synthetic truths, according to modern philosophers? Anyone? analytic truths are supposedly true apart from facts Clay: What "facts" ? What is a "fact" ? synthetic truths are true in fact, but apparently it is possible to logically conclude that something else might have been the case. Analytic truths represent concrete instances of the Law of Identy. (ITOE) Glenn, you just read the article:) A fact is some thing in reality that exists apart from man to which he can refer to do validate his conclusions. (BradA@U) As I understand it, synthetic truths are those which are intrinsic to the existents involved, and analytic truths are intrinsic to the words in a syllogism. -do Could we have a clearer definition, please? They are tautologies: A man is a man. Sube: maybe some examples are in order: remember, I'm asking what *modern philosophers* refer to as analytic/synthetic truths. Sube, from me? Tym: go ahead Clay: from anyone "Balls are round" is true because of the constituent parts of the proposition, whereas... Analytic truths are true by reference to the definitions of the terms involved; synthetic truths are truth by reference to observation. Analytic truths are those truths which can be validated meerely by an analysis of the meaning of the constituent concepts. "The house is brown" needs to be empirically verified in order to be true. Okay, those two from PeterJ and ToddM are clearer ... So an analytic truth is one which doesn't predicate anything beyond what's contained in the definitions of the terms it uses? Correct And a synthetic truth is which requires that you look to reality in order to verify it? is which = is one which right [LurchGS] Bureaucrats ARE good for one thing: target practice Someone used the term "tautology" - what does that mean? Tautology means a logical use? Todd: Not in this context. It repeats the same thing The subject is restated in the predicate. (BradA@U) "Water is wet." Glenn: ok. So saying that "man is a rational animal" is equivalent to saying "a rational animal is a rational animal" according to those who consider this an analytical statement? Right, b/c in the statement, "water is wet," wet is entailed in the definition of water... Yes. okay ... What do modern philosophers say about certainty regarding analytical/synthetic truths? Why? From what little I've seen, they would seemingly have to say they could only "probably" be true. Analytical truths are certain and synthetic truths could be otherwise. Todd: why? If your statement is about existents, it can not be proven. If it is demonstrated by logic you are being subjective. oops I missed modern... then both analytical and synthetic are considered to be arbitrary. Glenn: Why cannot it be proven? (I'll ask the question about why it's subjective later) The mind has no identity or process of proving. Anyone - why can't synthetic statements be proven? Glenn: okay, some existentialists would say that. What about other schools of modern philosophy? b/c existents are facts by their definitions they could be otherwise by our conscience choice. The subjectivist would say that since the mind processes knowledge, it corrupts it or even invents it. Todd: yes, but we're talking about synthetic statements. You're going beyond the definition to observe the facts of reality here. <> Odegard is back. Subetai, b/c you aren't all-knowing, and some later fact could blow your old "truth" out of the water. Glenn: so you're introducing the view that the senses are corruptible. What else? Clay: Okay, there's the claim that certainty requires omniscience. What else? Something directly related to the A-S dichotomy we're considering, perhaps? That knowledge of reality is impossible since our minds distort it. What's their view of existence? What's their metaphysics? "facts of reality" implies "reality" - an objective, existing universe The A-S dichotomy manifests itself metaphysically as the necessary/contingent dichotomy. What's a "necessary" fact of reality versus a "contingent" fact? Necessary facts are something that has to be.. contingent could have been otherwise. Clay: So they say some aspects of reality could be otherwise? right Subetai, yes... I'm trying to think of an example.. My professor held up a piece of chalk and said that when he dropped it, it would fall, but it could have been otherwise.. In other words, existence (1) doesn't have to be, and/or (2) has to be, but could be otherwise, i.e., could take a different form? Could I have an example of a "necessary" fact? the moon might not be made of green cheese but it could be made of chocolate. necessary-a man is a rational animal MCM: same as for the A/S dichotomy. Anything that's definitional. I see. Thanks. For example, 2+2=4. Contengent implies something outside of identity or causality. Sube: AS dichotomy is implicitly primacy o consciousness. Contingent Glenn, correct If I could ask a question? Okay, so what I'm pointing out here is that if one believes in the necessary/contingent dichotomy, you *can't* be certain of synthetic truths. [Angus_] Chris Hamilton, 17, hs senior right Because any synthetic truth says something about reality, which could have been otherwise. right Do modern philosophers actually believe this? Clay: sure, what question? Sube: "yes, but" ;) Tym: how's that? In regard to my chalk example earlier, how would they put off the conclusion that it falling is contigent? Sube: I'm just phrasing how they'd reply :) What was the chalk example? Paste it? it could have flew Certainly skeptics would believe this. Dropped chalk falls, but it could have been otherwise. (was the example) Thanks, MCM. I was asking what's there in their philosophy that permits the belief. Religion says God made the universe, he could have made it otherwise or not made it at all. What's the secular version? sub: One can imagine it floating. Sube: "possible worlds". ...Leibniz, Kripke. Secular: My mind is the universe or society decides what is true. Primacy of consciousness... Well, they're saying it's contingent on the universe being as it is (i.e, the chalk falling). But you can "conceive" or "imagine" that it doesn't. That man makes his own reality mcmast: Yes. The Primacy of Consciousness definitely leads to contingent facts. Just like you can imagine 'god,' hmm.. heh Tym: okay, so what's their view of existence/identity there? (BradA@U) Well, the "constructionist" view seems to be very widely held -- that reality is a subjective creation of (usually collective) consciousness. Sube: that there's no one reality. Exactly, Gabe and Clay That's what I had in mind. (BradA@U) Obviously, on this view, reality could be anything. In an interesting, perverted way, they are affirming the existence of volition. Hence the phrases "in MY reality..." -s They're separating existence from identity? That is, they acknowledge that *something* exists, but that something could be anything? (BradA@U) MCM: Exactly. They are quite insistent about this. This is not mere triffling over terms. They have an inverted conception of the relationship of consciousness to existence. Sube: yes. This conditions their view of the metaphysical status of facts. Anyone have anything else to add to this before we move on to the next point? Existents do not have firm identities independent of anyone's awareness. It sure explains a lot about people's minds. (BradA@U) There is a fact which gives rise to inversion of the ontological/epistemological relation: the fact that perception of reality, is a phenomenon of consiousness. It also leads to emotionalism. (BradA@U) Thus, from the point of view of the perceiver, in order, there is the consciousness, then the reality. Okay, we've looked at the A-S dichotomy from the point of view of metaphysics. Let's see what's wrong with it epistemologically. I'll start by asking: what should the concept "man" refer to in reality? Man and all of his attributes sub: And what gives rise to the separation of identity from existence? All the characteristics of men and all men past present and future. Religion. (Frisco1@U) | Todd: Even possibilities that have not come about? yes gabe: I guess some kind of belief in miracles, i.e., things don't have to be what they *are* - they could be anyything. sub: Which is rooted in a belief in some sort of cosmic consciousness controlling existence. Gabe: "God" sort of exists without identity, no? It, the consciousness, can make things do *anything* regardless of their identity. Gabe: right, - it's rooted in a belief that existence isn't a self-sufficient primary - that it depends on something else. mcmast: According to the negative theologians, a God with identity would no longer be God. sub: exactly. I think the belief in some sort of cosmic consciousness controlling existence is rooted in the fact of how difficult it would be for a normal person to figure *anything* out when the few exceptional men first began developing concepts.. Clay, exactly-lack of self-esteem Developing concepts? Or theories on concepts? I'd guess all men develop concepts to some degree... Clay, and knowledge. clay: That's true from a historical view but not from pure philosophy. on = of Okay, so we agree that "man" refers to all the attributes of *all* the entities that can be subsumed under the concept, past, present or future? MCM, at some point, some ancestor of man evolved into the rational animal. Todd, right. Sub:right Sub: Yes Clay: yes, and all along the way, they were slowly evolving into conceptual beings. What's the difference between the concept and its definition? The concept subsumes all the characteristics Concept includes many - all? - attributes, definition is only essentials. MCM, right, and the average rational beings would've had one shitty existence. , = ; What do you mean by "essentials" ? Essentials are those fundamental characteristics that determine identity. MCM; Everything determines identity. E.g., "rational animal". The definition sets man apart from all other animals as the rational one. The concept is the way that the knowledge is held. "Man" is the concept. A definition of man states the concept in terms of a genus and a differentia. essentials are those facts which serve to distinguish a concept from the other concepts in its genus. Clay: so how do you pick what's "essential" ? Yes. But a four-thumbed but otherwise normal man is a man due to his being a rational animal. The number of thumbs is non-essential. I mean, fact(s) (BradA@U) A concept is the mental existent which omits the measurements of the referent units; definitions are condensations of concepts, and omit everything except the essential characteristics needed to keep concepts distinguished one from another. (BradA@U) concepts keep reality organized; definitions keep concepts organized, and tied to reality. Brad: I've never seen things put quite that way. Well done. Whats essential should subsume the most characteristics of the concept What characterstics would you pick as essential in forming a definition? Depends on the existent you're defining. MCMast, right MCM, he's asking for an abstract answer. I know... The one that separates it from all other members of its genus (CCD) Todd: You mean, the "essential" characterstic(s) is that upon which MOST of the other characterstics depend? (BradA@U) In example, she noted that rationality explains far more about man that the fact he has no fur. yes Ok. So are we agreed on that definition of "essential" ? meaning omit the measurement of all particular definitions and retain the fact that you have some definitions and then see what you come up with. (BradA@U) (actually, I may have imagined the fur part, but the rationality part is one example she gave) sure Glenn: ? Sub: What are you asking? Given our understanding of concepts, can such a thing as an "analytical truth" exist? The CCD does not separate a thing from the other members of in its genus. all truths are analytical Glenn: I was asking if you were happy with that definition of "essential" since you gave another. Truth without referent in reality? I think not. Todd: According to the definition of "analytical" we've just used? no Definitions depend on facts... the analytics seem to think you can abstract away all facts and still have something... Subetai: Yes on your question. I was jumping ahead. No wonder they think nothing is something. Analytic truths are merely definitions. MCMast, with the above definition yes (BradA@U) Subetai: It would seem that the analytic/synthetic dichotomy depends on a flawed theory of concepts, which seems to be left implicit, not made explicit. Brad,yes. Since a concept includes *all* the attributes of *all* the entities subsumed under it, is it possible to have an "analytical" truth that doesn't predicate anything about the subject? Clay: The essential characteristic is the DC and the genus is the CCD. Glenn, right. Subetai, no (BradA@U) Clay: re: definition; indeed -- they are literally divorcing concepts from facts, a fact made eminently clear in the titles and abstracts of many modern "philosophical" papers. Brad: My understanding is that it's pretty explicit with modern philosophers. No truth can be analytical, since all concepts are properly formed by first observing reality. "Analytic truth" is a stolen concept. Peter: right Right Subetai Sube-yes, a foot is twelve inches (BradA@U) sube: Explicit, or *nihilistic*? i.e., are they positing theory of concepts X, or just claiming they are whatever we collectively want them to be? FB: And where did you get the concept of "foot" from? Brad: Explicit. The nominalists say that definitions are arbitrary, *and* that concepts are equivalent to their definitions. arbitrarily decided FB: a "foot oops... (BradA@U) Another sorely missing piece of this puzzle is a general theory of induction and of ideas, which latter are even more complex than concepts. FB, so a "foot" doesn't refer to anything? A "Foot" is *defined* as 12 inches. Saying so is no real statement about the "foot". (BradA@U) The idea that one can reduce epistemology to little few-word sound bites, really ignores the most important problems of context, validity, hierarchy, evidential validity, etc. etc. Brad: yes. Add that to the list of their sins. A foot is a standard of measure- a man-made fact. I was just giving an example of analytic statement! So the epistemological flaw with a purely analytical statement is that it assumes that a concept is equivalent to its definition. Therefore, you can repeat the definition in a tautology and claim that you're saying nothing about reality ..... that your statement predicates nothing other than what is said in the definition? FB: You can give all the examples you want...the question was whether such actually exists. Subetai, right reality = reality, MCM-NO FB: exactly. I thought you were proposing that as one. Sorry. Todd: so why is the statement "man is a rational animal" not analytical? Subetai, you just implicitly described the difference between intension and extension right? :) Subetai: So are you saying that purely analytical statements are rationalistic, cut off from reality? Subetai, b/c it includes all of the other characteristics of man. Subetai, man is a rational animal serves a cognitive function by enabling one to deal w/ concept contexutally. Glenn, yes Glenn: Right, that's what they'd be, given their definition. But I'm pointing out a more fundamental flaw. I'm saying that no statement can be purely analytical if one uses the Objectivist theory of concepts. Sub: Such a statement is plenty "analytical" (given the definition of analytical used here) - it's the "truth" part that fails. but it also presupposes all other characteristics of man. I agree Subetai. MCM: Their definition of "analytical" includes that it predicates nothing else about the subject other than what is included in the definition. Subetai, did you catch my question about intension and extension? ...and thus the definition and the concept are supposedly equivalent. I see. Thanks. But saying that "man is a rational animal" is not equivalent to saying "a rational animal is a rational animal" because man is not equivalent to "rational animal" - in order to define man as rational animal, you must have observed man ..... and come to the conclusion that "rational animal" was his essential characterstic, and therefore that definition includes your *entire* knowledge about man, gained through observation, i.e., synthetically. So the moderns are rationalist. Objectivism holds that "rational animal" refers to the essential quality of man that occurs in reality. Todd: I'm not sure what you asked. Extension versus intension is an unecessary dichotomy too. Right, it is apart of the A/S dichotomy We're done with the moderated part. Keep going with the questions if you want. this was cool.. I'll bbiaf So the A/s dichotomy epistemologically has an incorrect view of concepts and metaphysically between necessary and contigent facts. Is the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy something that occurs in individuals or is it a word that describes the just the breach in philosophy? Todd: right (BradA@U) I would sure welcome a comprehensive treatise on epistemology. Subetai, I have a question regarding something from the A/S article in the O'ist by Dr. Peikoff. (BradA@U) I mean, not here now, but I am waiting for some very clever philosopher to develop one. :) Glenn: It occurs in both. It can take other forms in individuals. For example, the distinction between the practical and the moral. I was going to say earlier that in modern society that the idea that facts aren't absolute is fostered quite simply by incredible irrationalism, typically on the part of religious fanatic parents Todd: yes? Subetai, he says in talking about forming a concept..."the concept which subsumes all concretes of this number(a potentially unlimited number)." ...and also the fact that b/c of things like the analytic synthetic dichotomy, people think philosophy is disconnected from reality, and swerve off into psychotic pragmatism. Subetai, I am not sure that "potentially unlimited is correct" arent all things limited and therefore no potential exists for the unlimited. Todd: All that "unlimited" means is that we're not setting any limits on how many entities can be part of this set. Reality sets limits on the number of humans that exist now, or will exist in the future. (BradA@U) Clay: Indeed, it is part of responsible child rearing, to discipline children's *mental* habits, as well as their physical ones, and to promote a proper rational method of thinking. Unlimited isn't the same as infinite. (BradA@U) That many parents actually foster and reward irrationality, is terrible. All he's saying is that whenever an entity exists that satisifes the requirements of "man" we'll call him "man" Subetai, thanks I see, I was interpreting it in another context:) [Odegard] Frode Odegard, of Odegard Labs Inc. (www.odegard.com) Subetai, I was trying to be too literal....which leads me to another thing I keep hearing lately....people say that it is possible to have too much of a good thing, do you agree? Did you folks see what I meant by "there can't be an analytical statement the way they describe analytical statements" ? Subetai, yes. (BradA@U) Is it moral to eavesdrop on someone's email? I don't think so. John Dvorak is bragging in his column about snooping on Microsoft employees at an airport, and reading their email, whose contents he is publishing. Subetai: Does the A.S. Dichotomy refer then to the clash between the moderate realist view and the nominalist view? Glenn, dont they both hold the A/S dichotomy? (BradA@U) Maybe morality is good in theory... Glenn: Metaphysically, it refers to any separation of Existence/Identity/Causality. Epistemologically, it refers to a breach between reality and consciousness. Wright, are you here? Id like to say hi again. I havent talked with you in about 5 months when we met on this channel...Do you remember me? Glenn: For example, the belief that you can make an analytical statement that refers to *only* definitions. Where did the definitions come from? Right. I see that. Historically, though, where does it come from? Glenn: In the epistemological form, Plato believed that concepts represented supernatural essences that had a real existence outside a man's mind. Right. Historically it comes right down from Plato. I do believe that Kant first explicated it. Therefore, it was proper to talk about "man-ness" as something real, distinct from man. (BradA@U) I find it very difficult to hold highly abstract, erroneous theories in mind over time. Since they are not depictions of reality, one can't hold them via a direct conceptual form, but must hold them as assemblages of erroneous constructs. (BradA@U) How do others deal with this problem: that of retaing in conceptual form, invalid ideas? You can't, Brad. (BradA@U) But obviously philosophers do -- Subetai has been giving a lucid exposition of this subject this evening. memorize. Kant did away with the supernatural essences of Plato, but retainted the dichotomy by saying that essences were arbitrary contructs of the mind. retained I re-read it recently. Ask me tomorrow. Subetai: Is the term A-S Dichotomy a term used widely outside of Objectivism? Philosophers talk about A and S truths all the time. Glenn: Far as I know, they don't call it a dichotomy. They accept it as a given, as a fact. I'm taking a logic class this semester and it's just constant. Right. They refer to analytic and synthetic truths. They also acknowledge it in various other ways (such as the intension and extension of a concept that Todd mentioned). Peikoff says that they won't argue whether it's justifiable, because they say that it exists, therefore synthetic truths are uncertain, therefore you can't use reality as a means to show that the A/S dichotomy is false. (BradA@U) "The Analytic/Synthetic Duality" maybe? I'm gonna run for now. I'll be back in a half hour or so if I don't go to bed. IM back Subetai, I was talking with Wright. ok, Todd Subetai, did you catch my question about having too much of something good? Subetai: This was a good discussion. It's the chapter in ITOE I have not really dug into. Todd: Yeah. I'd say that's an instance of context dropping. Thanks, Glenn. Subetai, I dont think that you can, once a thing becomes too much that it becomes harmful to oneself it ceases to be good and becomes bad. Yes, context dropping:) It's saying that too much of something (what something?) can be innately good or bad. Regardless of what that something is, how much of it is "too much" and by what standards it's bad and to whom. (BradA@U) Thanks for an interesting discussion. Subetai, there logic is -food is good-eating too much steak will make you sick-therefore too much of food( which is good) can be bad. Subetai, what would you say to a subjectivist who claims that there are no objective standards and you the example -How many grains of sand are in a heap of sand? (Peter@U) Good night, everyone. I enjoyed our discussion very much. But then they generalize food to all things that can be values? How do they justify that generalization? By dropping the context that food is good to an organism for a *purpose* - that of providing nutrients adequate to its needs. you =use Subetai, right. I don't understand the sand question. A person I know who is explicitly subjective, asked me how many grains of sand are there in a heap of sand? As an example that there is no determinable number-therefore no objective standards exist. Subetai, or rather it was in the context that reality is not black and white. Ah. They conveniently forgot to mention the weight of the heap and the weight of an individual grain of sand and whether the grains were uniform in weight. They're saying you mustn't draw exact conclusions from inexact information? I have no problem with that. Todd. She is confusing being omnicient (being able to look at the pile of sand and say how many grains are in it) and being certain. Tell her to count the grains of sand. Subetai, right, they forgot to define their standard of measure. When I asked that he said it was irrelivant. thanks! good night all! I'd ask him to come up with a better example to show what he meant. Because I have no idea what he's implying there. Glenn, that wasnt the point. He was using it as an example to say that reality isnt definable- in other words knowable. Subetai, Glenns answer from me explains it a little better. Subetai, he conciously chooses to evade reality. Tell him to show you the heap and you'll tell him how many grains of sand it has, provided he'll pay you by the hour for counting. Subetai,:) That since you can't look at a pile of sand and say how many grains are in it, you can't be certain of anything. Glenn, right:) Hmmm... so he expects some mystical revelation that should tell him how many grains it has. He doesn't believe in methods that lead to knowledge, i.e., counting. Hey all, I think the discussion was great, I actually kept up typing today:) I must go to bed though. 4am comes awful earlier. See everyone tomorrow:) later Todd Since your not omniscient, you can't be certain Subetai, actually he is completley non-mystical which really doesnt make sense. you're Glenn, you're? Mystical doesn't necessarily mean "believes in gods or spirits or little elfs" instead or your Glenn, ok See you later. Later Subetai, ok...bye bye:) bye Todd IRC log ended Fri Sep 6 23:38