IRC log started Fri Oct 18 21:58 Welcome to #GeekSpeak. Before we begin, I'd like to remind you that all channel logs are the copyright of the channel owners: Pankaj Saxena and Tom Wright. Logs may not be redistributed in any form without the prior consent of the channel owners. Tonight's discussion is on Abstraction from Abstractions, and will be moderated by Glenn Martin. As usual, the discussion will be conducted in keyword-protected mode. If you see someone off-channel whom you think would like to join the discussion and would not be disruptive, please message me or Wright. Okay, Glenn. Go ahead. :) OK Thanks Subetai: Here are the points I would like to cover in tonight's discussion: 1) The two types of cognition after the first-level concepts have been formed. 2) The role of language and words in forming concepts and abstractions from abstractions. 3) The 'Parrot Epistemology' 4) Differences between first-level concepts and abstractions from abstractions. 5) Mechanics of forming an abstraction from abstractions: The role of the Conceptual Common Denominator and the Distinguishing Characteristic. 6) The two fundamental methods of cognition. Here are definitions of some terms we will be using in the discussion. I assume that most of you are already familiar with at least the first two chapters of ITOE and have some understanding of the mechanics of concept formation. Definitions are either from ITOE or The Ayn Rand Lexicon. Concept: A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted. Commensurable Characteristic(s) (CC): Characteristic possessing a common unit of measurement (shape in the case of tables, hue in the case of colors). An attribute possessed by all of the objects in forming a concept. Conceptual Common Denominator: The characteristic(s) reducible to a unit of measurement, by means of which man differentiates two or more existents from other existents possessing it. gack He'll be right back. Hmmm...and I was just asking about the "great flood." Maybe Noah was on irc? ;) HAL's 'crow' was obviously overloaded his screen got messed up - he'll be right back Paste a bit slower, Glenn. About 15 lines per minute/ Here we go with the rest of the definitions. Distinguishing Characteristic(s) A specified category of measurement within the conceptual common denominator involved. (the particular characteristics of the units of a concept: In the concept table, the particular kind of shape that tables have) Abstraction: A selective mental focus that takes out or separates a certain aspect of reality from all others (e.g., isolates a certain attribute from the entities possessing it, or a certain action from the entities performing it..) Glenn: I upped the flood limit to 100 lines/min. Keep going, but give folks a minute or so to read each screen. ok The rest won't be as long. I think that it is obvious to most students of Objectivism why a knowledge of concept formation and Objectivist epistemology is important, but I thought I would include this quote by Ayn Rand to emphasize that importance. Here is a quote by her referring to the four dominant schools of thought on the ‘problem of universals’: ‘If, in light of such ‘solutions,’ the problem might appear to be esoteric, let me remind you that the fate of human societies, of knowledge, of science, of progress and of every human life, depends on it. What is at stake here is the cognitive efficacy of man's mind.’ (ITOE, p. 3, Forward) Here's another quote by Rand on the subject: "It is the epistemological obligation of every individual to know what his mental file contains in regard to any concept he uses,..."ITOE, p. 67, "The Cognitive Role of Concepts". With that in mind, on with the discussion. How does understanding concept formation help an individual to know what his ‘mental file’ contains? [Gardner] As seen in PC Week. (http://www.pcweek.com/builder/0701/01dmain.html) Anyone? He learns how to validate concepts. Glenn: Well, is the file just a random bit of mental flotsum, or is it an understanding of existence. How does he do this. Any particular method? He learns where he got his concepts from -- or his errors from. Anyone else? He reduces his concepts to the percepts the are (or should have been) based on. Right Betsy. Because it allows to explicitly understand on what basis the referents are included in the file. Otherwise, things can easily get filed in the wrong folders, by association with inessential attributes of other items there. the=they Glenn: ..and integrates them with the totality of his knowledge. The Objectivist theory of concepts shows one how to trace his higher-level abstractions down the conceptual chain to perceptual concretes, thereby allowing their meanings to be grasped. The meaning of a higher-level concept can not be grasped unless the meanings of its constituent concepts have been grasped. Glenn: he needs to be able to trace his mental contents back to some starting point...that starting point is perception. Right Tom. ok on to Abstractions. Perception is self-evident, and therefore unquestionable. Why does Ayn Rand spend almost three pages discussing the role of language and words in this chapter before going on to discussing the two interacting directions of cognition? As example: if I have Vermeer and Raphael in my folder of 'artists', I should be careful not to put a monkey that splatters paint on canvases there, even though he produces canvasses with paint on them. Right Tim Tym You can't have concepts without words (or their equivalent perceptual tags). Right. Anyone else? Words are the means by which concepts are maintained over long periods of time. In the format of the chapter, what does this discussion do? Because words are the final step in bringing first level concepts into reality. A firm foundation on which to base futher abstractions. Glenn: words serve as perceptual concretes so that the crow isn't overloaded. Without words, we are stuck on the perceptual level (or, maybe implicitly a little higher, until the next input comes in). Right Bill! Although Rand didn't say it, there is a period of about 3-4 years between the time a child uses words and the time he can make abstractions from abstractions (AFAs) They serve the crucial role of unit reduction -- because of the 'crow' effect -- man's limited ability to hold units in mind -- words perform this function, by replacing all the referents of a concept with a single, easy to manage concrete which will invoke the sum of the concept. Right Brad. (tktkTad@U) words stand for the concepts that are then mental integrations that are then used in differentiating "new" entities ? Because you'll need your first-level abstractions totally solid if you want to treat them as units for higher-level abstractions. Right Tad. She spends the time on words and language to set up the proper context for her discussion of cognition. In order to form an Abstraction from Abstractions, one first must have formed valid first-level concepts represented by *words* whose referents are the facts of reality. ‘In considering the nature of concepts and the process of abstracting from abstractions, we must assume a mind capable of performing (or of retracing and checking) that process.’ What does learning to speak consist of? Learning to understand what words mean. Using words appropriately--i.e. knowing the referent. Laerning the referents of everyday words ostensively. Right Gilles. Reconcretizing abstractions in a rality-oriented fashion. reality Right Betsy Learning to say the words for the things which one already understands. So what do words stand for? Ideas. Words stand for the mental integration of two or more referents. An indefinite number of concretes that exist in reality or relationship(s) among them. Right Subetai Concepts. A word stands for a concept, which stands for the referents in reality from which it was originally formed. Grasping meanings, the referents of words, the kinds of existents that words denote in reality Glenn: At first they stand for concretes of value to the child - "mama" and later ostensively defined concepts. moving along. Luap: Actually, words typically do not stand for ideas, though some words(concepts) *are* concepts of ideas. What is the ‘Parrot Epistemology? Can someone give an example? .x(!)x. xx .x(!)x. ;) That's when you say words and phrases without knowing what you're talking about. Something said that has no meaning in the mind of the speaker. Right Gilles and Tom. 'Parrot Epistemology' is using words one has acquired purely by mimicry -- by association of some elements of the referents, with no understanding of the actual defining characteristic. When I learned the Gettysburg Address in the 4th. grade. All those prayers I learned in Hebrew school. Poseurs discussing Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky in coffee shops ;) That's *really* parrot epistemology! The Pledge of Allegience. ok on to Abstraction from Abstractions How about animal "rights" activists using the word 'right' when talking about Parrot Rights. Angus: depends on if you *grasp* the pledge while saying it. What does ‘Abstraction from Abstractions’ refer to? What does it mean? allegiance. tym: so does everything else that's been mentioned. oh boy! An abstraction from abstraction takes place when the (direct) referents of a concept are not directly perceptible, but are themselves concepts. It means forming concepts from concepts rather than from percepts. Abstraction from abstraction means forming an abstraction that is dependent on the prior abstraction properly conceptualized. Right Brad Right Bill and Tom Rand discusses two methods of forming an abstraction from abstractions in this chapter. What are they? Forming "color" after grasping "red," "green," "purple," etc. Integrating and subdividing. Integration and differentiation. Right Tom. Wider to narrower and wider from narrower. Anyone else? or Forming "powder blue," "royal blue," and "cobalt blue," after grasping "blue." There is the process of subdividing an existing concept into more specific sub-concepts; and there is integrating concepts into a wider concept. Table -> types of tables; Table, chair, sofa -> furniture; Right Brad (RayV@U) Epistemologically treating concepts as if they were concrete referents Forming concepts of more extensive knowledge (wider concepts) and concepts of more intensive knowledge (narrower concepts). Integrating previously held concepts into wider ones, or subdividing concepts into narrower ones. How do the units in a first-level concept like ‘table’ differ from the units of a wider second-level concept like ‘furniture’? Glenn: the first are percepts, the second are concepts. They units of an AFA are not ostensively defined. Right Tym and Betsy -y First-level referents are perceptually similar...second (or higher)-level ones are not formed from just perception. (RonB@U) They refer to concretes, while furniture refers to concepts. I don't know, because I think the units of furniture are still perceptual concretes. Chairs, tables, etc. I don't understand how you're integrating the actual concepts and not the perceptions (abstracting their use.) Someone want to help me on this? Right Ray Gilles: TomM said it best. Gilles: Tables, chairs, beds, etc. are perceptually graspable, but there is not concrete furniture. Someone answer Gilles' question? Gilles: Sometimes, in a child's context, he may be using "furniture" or "silverware" as an ostensively-defined first level concept. Tym: Is that because you need to have concepts such as "home" etc.? Gilles: you can't arrive at 'furniture' JUST from percepts. Gilles raises a good point, because there are options in concept formation. Gilles the concepts are concretes that have words, "table", "chair", and "bed" which are abstractions First-level we perceive with our senses...higher-level we perceive with our concepts. Tom: The referents of furniture are all perceptible. How's that, Brad? Brad: There is not a furniture one can point to. But I think the answer is that we need to integrate other conceptualized knowledge, such as they are all man-mad objects designed for use in a dwelling. "home" and "use", etc. When you tell a 4 year-old "Get your feet off the furniture" he knows you mean THAT sofa or THAT table, but not that pizza. The CCD is their purpose, and that is generally immediately perceptible too. Betsy: Nonetheless, there is not thing furniture. not-no not=no From 'furniture', you can then get more intensive, and form subconcepts of types of furniture. Gilles. Did your question get answered? Meaning that a kid can form the concept "furniture" purely from perceptual concretes (including chairs, tables, etc.) without necessarily integrating in his mind the concepts "chair" "table" etc. Glenn: I think I answered it myself. Actually I'll amend myself. It depends on necessity, optionality as BradA said. No, that wasn't the question. It's close to being integrated from the perceptual level, but I don't think he could intgrate the concept furniture without first having integrated its constituent concepts I wasn't saying you could get furniture before you get chair and table. That's impossible except in a wierd environment. I was just asking about what you're abstracting *from*. I think we'll cover that as we go on. Gilles: You abstract from all the concrets subsummed, as well as the knowledge of them not immediately graspable via perception. Gilles: You can define furniture as "that which is used inside a house for sitting/lying on, laying things on, etc. (tktkTad@U) the ccd How are the units (concepts) of wider concepts treated epistemologically? How do they function in the conceptual process. Glenn: In what sense? (tktkTad@U) as units themselves? Gilles: You go from: "table is uded for eating off," "bed is used to sleep on," "couch is used to sit on," etc. (tktkTad@U) the units of "furniture" ie, chair , table ect ? Their essential characteristics are the omitted measurements. Gilles: in the context of a house, of course. Actually, to form concepts, you need several referents. A child may only have one referent of each, but he has the many referents of furniture. Now a kid whose father was a table salesman... How do they compare to the units of 1st-level concepts. Are they treated the same way? Brad: he has access to other houses...you couldn't form a concept of "table" if you saw or were aware of only one of a kind. (RayV@U) They are treated in an epistemological sense as 1st-level units are metaphysically They are treated as if each were a single (mental) concrete. (as percepts are in first-level concepts Right Ray Brad: though after he has formed "furniture" he may be able to go back and put "table" in it. Concepts retain all the characteristics of their referents, with some measurement(s) omitted. There are similarities and differences which can be identified amongst these condensations of reality. So the process is essentially the same ... oops...he may be able to know that this one and only one thing (table) belongs in "furniture." Right Brad With higher-level abstractions, you're abstracting conceptualized attributes as opposed to perceived attributes with first-level abstractions. two or more concepts which are the same in some characteristic(s) but differing from all others, can be subsumed into a new concept, by omitting the measurement of this shared attribute(s) Right Gilles attributes from the units the abstraction subsumes, I should have said to be clear. Metaphysically (in reality), what does each unit (a concept) of a higher-level concept stand for? THAT, I think was the answer I was looking for. Glenn: It stands for both the concrete referent *and* the mental integration of the lower-level abstractions. (RyanW@U) Glenn: An unlimited nuber of concretes. Tom: you could form the concept 'table' having only one kind, provided you had two or more. this is how we form concepts of all kinds of things whose constituent units are basically the same. Right Ray (tktkTad@U) all the concreteentities subsumed underet ehconcept (tktkTad@U) jeez sorry about that Brad: We are talking past one another...by one type, I didn't mean one of several types of table, but rather one item not perceptually similar to other things. It stands for a collection f units subsumed under the wider concept. What measurements are omitted when forming concepts from other concepts. (When you form the concept, ‘furniture’, what measurements of ‘table’, ‘chair’, and ‘bed’ are omitted?) Glenn: per the earlier example, functionality is omitted. The 'referent' question is crucial -- this is where (epistemological) objectivists and rationalists part company -- rationalists start engaging in this AFA process without any further connection to reality. Glenn: their shape and specific function. (tktkTad@U) their specific functions (tktkTad@U) or usages Right Tym and Tad Tad: In what way is that a measurement? How is "function" a measurement? For 'furniture', the CCD is their purpose and locale, so the specific measurement of shape/function is omitted. I know you omit the specific function, but in what way is that a measurement? Gilles, measurements can be attributes or functions as well as specific measurements (tktkTad@U) in the sense that the use must be in the range of human proportions re furniture Glenn, How are you defining measurement? Brad: I don't think so...the CCD is functionality..."used to put things on/in." Gilles: functionality has several measurements vis a vis sitter and sittee etc It's what is similar about all of the constituent concepts that can be omitted. (tktkTad@U) measurements =commensurable? It is also what distinguishes the constituent concepts from the other commensuralble characteristics on the CCD Gilles: Well, I believe this is where Rand posited the existence of an automatized mechanism of measurement/measurement ommission, directed by human volition, but not self-consciously. Brad: please elaborate. Also, "function" is a wider concept itself...like tools have a function, but that function differs from the function of furniture. Brad: I don't understand. (tktkTad@U) Brad is it not the auto recognition of differences or similarities of entities perceptually? Tom: the purpose/locale is objects people sit or put things on in a dwelling. By 'function', I meant any of the particular purposes, such as table, chair, sofa, bed, etc. which all have a particular function, yes. Brad: Ok, "locale" threw me off a bit. You omit the specific type of functionality. It's a range of function. It's a range of entities too In what way is that quantitative? Is it really measurement? Furniture's units are: tables, chairs, couches, etc. which are themselves first level concepts phil: the range of entities is determined by the range of functions. ok let's move on. What determines the Distinguishing Characteristic of a new higher-level concept? Glenn: That attribute/function/action that distinguishes those thing from all others. ...the most most distinguishes... Tym: Rand explained that the process of measurement and the corollorary process of measurement omission were automatic or built-in, unlike explicit processes of measuring, such as in measuring the weight of something, or its length -- or of understanding the concept 'measurement' explicitly. Right Tom And which explains most other characterstics. BradA Could you give a reference for Rand saying that? For example: Saws, glasses, computers all ahve a function (use), but the distinguishing characteristic of furniture is that which is used to place thing on...as a storage place. Betsy: Yes, just a moment. I'm curious too because I don't recall that ref. Brad: I think that's the difference between implicit and explicit you are refering to. Is the distinguishing characteristic always going to be the characteristic(s) that you abstracted in the first place to form the concept? Gilles: Yes, unless you had a mis-conception at first. Gilles yes until you add new knowledge that might change the DC. For example, to form furniture, I abstracted the characteristic location and use of the units. Those are the distinguishing characteristics, right? Gilles: Not necessarily, because your contex widens as you learn more about a concept's units. Betsy: Right, but at first. (tktkTad@U) ie child 's concept of man as the thing that walks and makes sounds Betsy: ex. 'Similarity is grasped *perceptually*; in observing it, man is not and does not have to be aware of the fact that it involves a matter of measurement. It is the task of philosophy and of science to identify that fact.' Gilles: They are the distiguishing characteristics *if* those attributes or knowledge of actually distinguished those items. ;) Brad: I think she means _perceptual_ similarities. Yes TomM & Gilles: I agree with Betsy. Consider the concepts "robin" and "bat." Perceptually they may appear similar, but a robin is conceptually more similar to flamingo. Betsy: another ex. 'Another example of implicit measurement can be seen in the process of forming concepts of colors.' ... Gilles. All you can use is the context of knowledge that you have at the time. Wright: that just depends on the state of yr knowledge. Wright" That is contextual. If he never saw a flamingo or other types of birds, it would be proper to put "bat" and "robin" together into "bird" (temporarily). Certainly similarities in abstractions from abstractions can't be grasped perceptually Wright: depends on whether you encounter flamingoes and robins before robins and bats. Betsy: Yes, she does, but the point is that the actual measurement process, qua mathematical process, is implicit Hey, that's right, Brad. Similarity can't be grasped perceptually when you're abstracting from abstractions. That's the whole point. "bird" would then be defined as" something with wings that flies." Later, one would ahve to add "feathers" into the definition of "bird." Brad: Measurement is implicit in sense perception. That is what the senses ARE -- measuring instruments. Brad: Oh, sorry. Actually, can't it be argued that volition and concept formation are intimately connected and _not_ automatic? phil: Brad wasn't saying concept formation is automatic, all he was saying is that an explicit measuring unit is dnot needed to form higher-level concepts. (tktkTad@U) tom what if child observed only birds not in flight wouldn't the concept the be things with feathers? Tad: Could be. But that doesn't answer the question of what it means to "measure its function." That doesn't mean anything, does it? Tom: Sense perception is automatic and not volitional; grasping similarities of shades of blue is arguably practically automatic Tad: probably...like if he only saw kiwis and emus or such. phil: No doubt, but that was not the issue Brad was raising. Gilles: Functions are measured normatively -- as causal means to the purposes of living organisms. (tktkTad@U) but then that would not be a rational concept in a context of "adult" level of knowledge Gilles. All of the items have the function of supporting other things and some size. They are the measurements you omit. Gilles: cAn you determine the difference of function of a glass, a hammer, and a table? Tom: Yes. Gilles: but I bet you can't give a measuring unit (like one or two feet) to explicitly identify what the specific measiurement is. Betsy: Oh, that's right. Thanks. OK. Let's move along. We can discuss this after the discussion. phil: The sensual differentiation is automatic, but the decision to form and retain a concept based on the perceived differences/similarities is volitional. Can you form the concept, ‘furniture’ just with the concepts, ‘table’, ‘chair’, and ‘bed’? Tom: Just because it's a difference, why is it a measurement? Glenn: No. BradA: But what I'm noting is that "perceive" in the current context: Abstractions from abstractions: is really just an analogy not literal reality, unlike 1st level concept formation GlennM: No. Gilles: "measurement" simply means identifying a difference or a similarity. Right. Why? GlennM: No foil. Glenn: You need a "foil" -- another unit which is _unlike_ the other units in some respects. Tom: I thought it meant relating something quantitatively to a unit. Right John and Betsy. Glenn: I don't understand the question. 'Just with'?? as opposed to also having what? As they say on Sesame Street -- "One of these things is not like the other ..." Gilles: it can be qualitative as well. Brad: Do you need other similar objects to differentiate them from? What happens if you don't have some other objects? Tom: Qualitative? That's not measurement. How do you define measurement? GlennM: The difference doesn't pop out at you. Glenn: without other objects, there would be no reason to fom the higher-level abstraction. (tktkTad@U) gilles how inches to the pound? Right John. They will all seem like diffferent objects. fom=form (tktkTad@U) sorry how many.. GlennM: Then you don't form a new concept because there is no need. To form "blue" you need red or green or some way different color. To form "furniture" you need, say, walls and floors and carpet and mom and dad in the house, differentiated from furniture objects As one moves farther away from the perceptual level, why does the interrelationship among concepts grow progressively more complex? phil: Yes, but it would appear that there is a unified underlying mechanism at operation here, which explains why for example, you can learn a concept first from direct experience, or abstractly from description, yet they are cognitively the same either way. Gilles: All measurements start off as qualitative differences before a unit of measurement is formed to measure it more explicitly. GlennM: There are more things to interrelate. Right John. Brad: Hmm. I think there's some interesting discussion there but probably best left for a later time.. Can anyone give an example of this? (tktkTad@U) gleen because one is moving further away from perceptual reality Yes. Furniture. You need to have conceptualized location and function. Right Gilles. Glenn: you have more concepts to integrate and reduce to perceptual reality. Glenn: Ah, you need to be able to consider them as a unit, which means to isolate some attribute they have in common, which makes them differ from all other things. That's the whole point about AFA's - you're uniting them by looking at previously conceptualized characteristics. At each step up the chain you add more and more concepts. For higher-level abstractions, not only is the perceptually given involved, but also a relationship amoung prior concepts. There are cross-relations as well. To grasp "Carpenter" involves knowledge of: men, tools, wood, etc. OK on to forming narrower concepts. Can someone give an example of forming a narrower concept? You have to look at previously conceptualized characteristics, because there's nothing perceptually similar. (If there is, it's a 1st level abstraction.) (tktkTad@U) carpenter Man --> batchelor. Glenn: Moving from "table" to "coffee table," "end table," dinning room table," etc. Right Betsy and Tom In subdividing a concept into a narrower concept what becomes the new Conceptual Common Denominator? All those tables were at first known to be essentially similar...the more narrow concepts realizes there are differences within those similarities. The D.C. of the wider concept. (tktkTad@U) previously ommitted measurements The differentia of the wider concept becomes the genus of the narrower concept. Right Betsy and Bill Glenn: coffee table--something to put books and feet on ;) end table--womething to put a lamp on, dinning room table-- something to put food on. How is the Distinguishing Characteristic formed in forming a narrower concept? Glenn: It is merely made more specific. By the same process: measurement. The previous distinguishing characterstic is made more precise. or specific (RayV@U) by dividing the range of the CCD into sub-ranges Right Subetai. By specifying a more limited range within the wider concept using some added characteristic(s) It is that attribute which distinguishes it from the wider concept. By introducing the new narrower range of specified measurements or additional characteristics into the Conceptual Common Denominator. The Distinguishing Characteristic of coffee table would be its range of function and size on the CCD of ‘table’ Right bill. phil makes an important point -- there is some new *fact* in reality motivating this intensive process of subdivision Bill: Well, it doesn't distiguish it from the wider concept, but rather from the other things subsummed dunder the wider concept. Otherwise, we could slice and dice measurements at random. Ok. Just one or two more questions. Brad: So long as you slice and dice within the prior concept, that may be OK. Does man have to reintegrate every time he encounters another instance of a previously integrated concept? Yes, to see it as "another instance". Glenn: Not every time. With simpler concepts it's automatic. Yes. Glenn: if it differs in any significant sense, one may have to form a new concept, or failing that, a simple descriptive appelation. Glenn: No, that's the whole point of having a concept in the first place...so you can do it once, then recognize the other members of that group. Glenn: He has to integrate it, but much of the process of integration is automatized after a while. That is what is meant by saying we perceive with our concepts. (tktkTad@U) He has to integrate the new entity intoa previously integrted concept but need not reintegrate the "old" concept I agree with TomM. Glenn: You may have the concept 'animal,' but that doesn't mean you're going to know that a sponge is an animal. If you've correctly integrated the _concept_ then once you've identified a new specific unit of a concept, most of the integration has already been done, hence virtue of abstractions Once we have "table" we recognize--not re-integrate--it as a similar to other tables. Right Tom. (RayV@U) Rather than *reintegrate* we *subsume* under an already formed concept What do you call this subsuming? (RayV@U) deduction Recognition. (RayV@U) unit perspective? (Re-cognition) Right Ray john: Once you realize the sponge is alive, then all you need to find out is what type of life...then you recognize it as an animal, though you may ahve to integrate it as a sponge, first. Error though is possible ... if there's something that doesn't "fit" in the new unit it behooves you to find out why. If you integrated "all swans are white" and you see a black one, then that shows an error in your thinking (tktkTad@U) identify? Tom: re: slice'n'dice at will: Such as 'Beautiful blondes with blue eyes, 5'5in tall and 24 years old.'?? :) (tktkTad@U) You must identify the attributes of the entity , but the concept table must be formed prior to identifing a new design tha is encountered phil: it wouldn't be an error if all you ever saw were white swans. the concept would have to be upgraded, but that doesn't mean the prior one was wrong. TomM: sponges were classified as plants for thousands of years after the concepts of animal and plant were formed. They did have the concept sponge. phil: not necessarily an error, could be new knowledge more frequently. What is the process of observing the facts of reality and integrating them into concepts? Reason. (tktkTad@U) reason? john: well, that was an error...probably based on perceptual similarities, not scienctific knowledge. (RayV@U) induction. Or it's an element of reason. Identification? (tktkTad@U) reason is faculty, process is counsciousness? Concept formation is basically an inductive process. Brad: Ok, I mis-spoke. TomM: But that's the whole point. the error was going solely on perceptual similarities, rather than gaining knowledge of the fundamental of 'animal'. Right Tom. They were incorrectly integrated as plants, but correct within the context of knowledge of the time. Tym: No, it would be an error because white/black was not an _essential_ characteristic of the concept (tktkTad@U) voliton Right Ray Induction john: Ok, no problem. However, there is a difference in identifying the sponge as a type of living being versus integrating it the first time. phil: essential characteristics change with the state of yr knowledge too. phil: That is contextual. If swans were the only type of birds that were totally whiet, it would be a valid definition. The scheduled part of the discussion is over. Please continue to discuss this or anything else so long as it interests you. Tym: Right. "Essential" is an epistemological concept which depends on context. OK That's all I have for the discussion. Thank you for your participation. Thanks Glenn :) Good to have a substantive discussion. Thanks Glenn. Great topic. Thanks, Glenn. :) This went rather smoothly ;) Great job Glenn! Glenn: You covered a lot in a short time. Thank you! Thank you Betsy. Glenn: excellent discussion (RayV@U) Good job!! (RyanW@U) Thanks GLenn. Subetai: may I give a little blurb for myself? Thank you. I enjoyed preparing for it. Glenn: Thanks. TomM: The question was whether or not knowing a concept requires that you integrate new knowledge when it is "just another instance." I say Yes, and that's based in part on the issue of the sponge. <> Subetai nominates Glenn for covering the next chapter of ITOE. Brad: Sure. john: I don't think it does, except on a minimal level. for instance, you are in the woods and see some furry thing scuttling out of your way. You don't know what *type* of animal it is. but you do know it is an animal right away. Everybody is invioted to visit our gorgeous new house -- on the WEB. Next week I am going to be hosting a discussion of my Star Trek screenplay 'Riker Non Grata' Goodnight, all. Brad: I still haven't read that ;( http://compbio.caltech.edu/~sjs/house.htm Brad: It'd be great if you could aslo send a brief para or two I could include with the announcement. I will be conducting an esthetic/technical/intellectual analysis of it, and offering some ideas on how to convey intellectual themes and conflict between rational adults in drama. Subetai: Yes, I will. ok john: The concept "animal" is already integrated. this new instance is *recognized* as fitting the distinguishing characteristics of "animal." Brad: Was it made into an episode? If you are interested, I would recommend reading the script, which is on my web site: http://www.hookup.net/~baisa Also, I would be happy to mail anyone a text copy who doesn't have web access: baisa@tor.hookup.net TomM: yes, 'animal' is integrated. But new instances are not always recognized. Gilles: It was used as the basis for an episode. John: It depends how observant one is. In the case of the sponge, i think it requires highly technical knowledge to distinguish it as an animal instead of a plant. TomM: 'technical' or 'conceptual'? John: Why is it an animal instead of a plant? i.e., hightly conceptual metabolism, basically John: And notice metabolism is a very high abstraction...not very close to the perceptual level. you can see sponges eating. Hence, technical. eating is technical??? John: you can see venus fly traps eating as well. so why is a venus fly trap a plant instead of an animal? (the plot thickens) ;) I think Rand made the point that these types of borderline cases are areas of options, epistemologically. no you can't. you can see them trapping. the venus fly trap also photosynthesizes: sponges don't and they're not even green. Brad: i was getting there ;) but actually, a sponge must be classified as an animal...I dodn't think it's optional once you know more about it. I find this an interesting 'touchstone' -- some people regard concepts as primaries, into which all facts must be placed; others regard reality as primary, with concepts serving the role of permitting understanding of it. TomM: I agreee; it's not optional once you know more. BradA: I don't think that's what we're discussing at all. The venus fly trap example is perfect. photosynthesis is a very high level abstraction. The point is that one can recognize it is alive fairly easily, since it does consumed food, but whether or not it is a plant is a more difficult question. John: No, I was just offering an observation. =ExpHAL= [22:45] #Admin : 1 member ( 1 chop ), 0 bans whether it is a high level integration or not, the point I was making still holds: a new instance qua new instance must be integrated. Integration is involved for each new instance of a concept in some sense...the sense that something new is being added to the concept (a new instance). But, it does not require re-integrating the concept. OK, then we agree. John: All I'm saying is that it is more an act of recognition, not an act of integration. That's where we disagree. The integration is already there. Now one perceives with one's concepts as "filters". later, all